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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Robert Arthur Reinert for the Master of Arts in History 
presented May 7, 1997. 
Title: The Persistence of Elites and the Legacy of LG. Farben, A.G .. 
On a massive scale, German business elites linked their professional ambitions to 
the affairs of the Nazi State. By 1937, the chemical giant, l.G. Farben, became 
completely "Nazified" and provided Hitler with materials which were essential to conduct 
war. With its monopoly over the manufacture of critical wartime products and global 
business interests, LG. Farben became one of the most powerful companies in the world 
during World War II, and an integral part of the Third Reich power structure. The 
conglomerate also provoked hostile mergers within the conquered "territories" of the 
German Reich, and constructed one of the largest privately-owned synthetic oil and 
rubber factories in the world at Auschwitz, where extensive use was made of slave labor. 
After World War II, companies like l.G. Farben faced the four-power occupation 
policies of de-Nazification and decartelization. Yet due in large part to the impending 
threat of Communism, key policies of the occupation governments were weakened or 
rendered inoperative. These same industries recovered swiftly and expanded production 
into foreign and domestic markets; indeed, LG. Farben's three successor companies are 
now each bigger than their original parent company. Company executives tried at 
Nuremberg for their crimes and found guilty were given sentences of eight years or less, 
and many business leaders were able to resurrect their careers. Like many German firms 
of that era, LG. Farben typifies the way in which Germany's top business leaders 
exploited the resources available to them and adapted their political allegiances during 
and after World War II to maintain their power. 
Many believe that political interests drive business interests, when in fact, the 
case of LG. Farben suggests a reciprocal influence between these sectors, and greater 
corporate influence during the Third Reich than is widely known. Particularly under an 
expansionary dictatorship, the state may be used by elites as an instrument to build and 
hoard capital, allowing elites to compete effectively on a global scale, and industry serves 
as the engine which fuels the territorial ambitions of the state. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM 
Every mouth finds its own cup of tea. The more inept something is, the 
more admirers it will attract, just as the worst things delight the !:,Yfeatest 
number, because most people, as we have said, are smitten with folly. 
(Erasmus) 1 
Solche Buecher laesst du drucken! 
Treuer Freund, du bist verloren! 
Willst du Geld und Ehre Haben, 
Musst du dich gehoerig ducken. 2 (Heinrich Heine) 
I am investigating primary and secondary materials which provide critical 
insights regarding the character of modem social consciousness which excuse "crimes 
against humanity" for wisdom, reason, and the appearance of justice. Primary emphasis 
will be on German big business, particularly the chemical cartel of Interessen 
Gemeinschaft Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschafi (Community oflnterests of Dye 
Industries Inc.or I.G. Farben) during the Third Reich and including the Allied post-war 
process of de-nazification through 1953. The term "big business" is typically applied to 
large production organizations not owned by the state. Although in some cases the state 
may require economic planning to be conducted according to decisions by political 
authorities, big business has been generally left free to formulate its own policies 
according to its interpretations of market signals. 
Central to my investigation is the extent to which a company's actions during the 
Third Reich were voluntary, and its postwar fate as a result of those actions. The logic, 
1 Reinhard P. Becker, editor, German Humanism and Reformation (New York, 1982), 
p.91 
2 Heinrich Heine, Lyrische Gedichte und Ba/laden (Pittsburgh, 1987), p. 140 
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as well as the irony, of this problem is that "the same creativity and adaptability that 
allowed German industrialists to embrace autarky and to prepare Hitler's armies with the 
tools needed for aggression -- qualities often exercised by the very same men -- were 
responsible for the success ... under the new conditions of the postwar period."3 
A further intent of this thesis is to offer a critical context for its readers by 
examining the importance of wealth in two very different, but related political structures~ 
national socialism and democracy. In both systems, the debate about the essential 
character of elites has been highly contentious, particularly before the collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc economies. In general, there is no doubt that the National Socialists were 
enthusiastically subsidized by big business. Franz Neumann observed, "Fascism arose 
out of the need of economic power holders ... not to react to the communist threat but to 
suppress the democratic movement which aimed at utilizing political power for the 
rational and social structuring of the economy."4 As usual, the economic power holders 
understood the path upon which they must build, and they took it. 
The following interrelated questions will be addressed in this thesis: 
1. How did nineteenth and early twentieth century German industry determine the 
development of German business in general, and LG. Farben in particular, during the 
Second World War? 
3 Raymond Stokes, Divide and Pro~per (Berkeley, 1988), p.209. 
4 Richard A. Grundberger, A Social History of the Third Reich (London, 1991 ), p. 217 
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2. What was the role of big business in Germany during World War II, as personified by 
the LG. Farben company, and what was the nature of its symbiotic relationship with the 
NSDAP [ Nationalso=ialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei] regime? 
3. How did the end of the NSD..t\P regime impact I.G. Farben, and what was the 
disposition of the company and its assets during the post world war period? 
4. What is the accountability of LG. Farben for state-sponsored policies and practices 
which furthered its interests at the cost of human life? 
Most members of the German economic elite were not Nazi ideologues or fanatic 
anti-Semites. Nevertheless, leaders of major corporations proved to be enthusiastic 
partners of the National Socialists once the latter had taken power in 1933. They were 
also generally committed to the Aryanization policies of the Third Reich and sacrificed 
the lives of innocent people for profit and in order to maintain a privileged position in 
German society. Besides claiming that "they had no other choice than to comply with the 
mandates of the Hitler government,"5 business professionals outlined their defense after 
the war on grounds similar to those used by the common soldier and worker: by refusing 
to become an oppressor, they and their firms might have become victims. They had to 
protect themselves and their companies. Fear and 'opportunism' were blamed for their 
critical participation in Hitler's new world order. They believed their professional roles 
justified relief from moral responsibility. 
5 Joseph Borkin, l11e Crime and Punishment of I. G. F arben (New York, 1978), p. 151 
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As will be discussed in this paper, exploiting -- and ultimately expediting -- the 
genocidal political agenda of the Reich in the interest of profit became the standard 
operating procedure at LG. Farben. And despite the devastating human consequences of 
their business practices, the post-war fate of the leaders of that company and others make 
a strong case for the durability of industrial and financial elites through changes of 
political regimes. Their seeming indestructibility is echoed in our time, which is marked 
by the post-Cold War zeal for all things capitalistic, and the explosion of an inherently 
borderless telecommunications industry whose chips represent the new means of 
production, and whose technical lingo is spoken in Boston, Botswana and Beijing. 
While this thesis is by no means a definitive treatment of all aspects of the 
immensely complicated interpenetration of big business and the National Socialist State, 
it is an attempt to understand the essential nature of corporate elites in a specific 
company during a specific time period. 
II. DISCUSSION OF HISTORIOGRAPHY, METHOD AND 
SOURCES 
Wo kaeme der Heilige Geist hin, · wenn er bei jedem Reim persoenlich 
anwesend sein muesste.6 (Erich Kaestner) 
If business does not investigate itself: how can the historian investigate business? 
Added to the difficulty of documenting business practices in the context of a specific 
political regime is the tendency of companies to prohibit research into their archives and 
6 Erich Kaestner, Die Kleine rreiheit (Hamburg, 1952), p. 115 
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to settle legal problems out of court in order to maintain closed company records. An 
uncomplimentary history of a powerful corporation and its leaders may result in costly 
legal action. Such barriers have frequently discouraged scholarly ability and interest in 
the investigation of business history. As the historian Volker Berghahn proclaims, 
"[ o ]nly the 'capitalists' are still being exempted from the postulate of social science 
research. 11 7 
While interpreting events with cultural astuteness, historians have frequently 
ignored or downplayed the roles of certain elite groups in history. Nevertheless, as we 
get further from any event, more material surfaces. This problem of bias and subjectivity 
in historical scholarship is often remedied (and blurred) by time, which encourages new 
interpretations of sources. 
While seeking an acceptable approach to the study of German business history 
during World War II, I have been influenced by nineteenth century theorists such as Karl 
Marx. While Marx stated "[ d]ie Geschichte aller bisherigen Gesellschaft is die 
Geschichte vom Klassenkampf,"8 his followers have further analyzed his concept of a 
class struggle as follows: mankind is divided into different classes and the elite class 
dominates, and is represented by the state. While classical Marxist theory "stressed the 
coercive role of the state to the exclusion of all else,"9 Antonio Gramsci argued that the 
"ruling class is not only achieved by coercion but also elicited by consent. Gramsci also 
insisted that the state played a major role in cultural and ideological fields and in the 
organization of consent." 10 The fascist government of the National Socialists was 
7 Volker R. Berghahn, The Americani::ation of West German Industry (Cambridge, MA, 
1986), p. 8 
8 Karl Marx, Die Fruehschriften (Stuttgart, 1955), p. 525 
9 Tom Bottomore, ed., A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Cambridge, MA, 1983), p. 467 
JO Ibid. 
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essentially capitalist in nature, as it opposed class warfare, exploited labor and defended 
private property. Industrial giants such as LG. Farben flourished under their regime. 
In some cases, I have had to filter the perspectives of some twentieth century 
sources whose historical interpretations too often reflect Cold War and post Cold-War 
attitudes. Although the theme of my research is limited to a specific time, the inferences 
are not. 
It is a very convenient and psychologically satisfying way to present history by 
removing select important components of an era, which, we are told, need not be studied 
as a whole. Yet, traditionally, scholars have made their judgment about the general 
significance of their particular period or theme by determining \vhere their story begins 
and ends in time. If we can accept that at the end of each writing of history, there is 
analysis and judgment, then research of an era such as the Third Reich, should begin at 
its end. Adolf Hitler and the political leadership failed to explore any alternatives at the 
end. Under Hitler's leadership, there was underlying determination to embrace 
"Valhalla" and the compulsive conviction that struggle for struggle's sake must continue 
to reach an absolute end. There was to be no surrender to the enemies of the Reich. Nor 
had the leadership made a serious attempt to avert the government's determination to lose 
totally and undoubtedly. 
Occasionally, sociological research has been done on corporate "power elites," 
but history has been generally confined to discussions of diplomatic, political, and social 
histories, in which business remains in the background. There also exists a critical 
barrier to relating and revealing unpopular activity in the capitalist system. Particularly 
in capitalist societies, there is adherence to respecting individuals who have learned to 
combine a strong Promethean pride and ruthless individualistic defiance with financial 
success. The "Gesamtmensch universal genius ( as opposed to the ordinary 
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Teilmenschen) is one who represents the maximum of purity, profundity, and self-
mastery. 1111 Self-affirmation of life through financial "progress" has replaced the 
"weaker" false humanitarianism of the past. It is particularly in modem industrial 
nations, where corporate sponsorship of research programs has created a friendly 
environment for the larger business agenda. There is a "cultural" tendency of economics, 
business, and history scholars to avoid an in-depth study of improprieties by corporate 
management. However, regardless of national identification, one might ask whether 
there is an almost universal bias to protect those who manage the financial and industrial 
institutions: the privileged and indispensable elite. 
Methodology in this significant area of business history has ultimately taken a 
back seat. The well-publicized fact that it was possible for respectable business 
executives in the Third Reich (and elsewhere) to have participated in and profited from 
the murder of millions of human beings without having lost their money and elite status, 
has been less palatable for Western historians than in the East. Among most Marxist-
Leninist scholars, a historical and scholarly exploration regarding National Socialist 
totalitarianism has always been preceded by a discussion of how reactionary German 
industrialists and Junker landlords chose their leader, the demagogic Adolf Hitler, "to 
enable them to maintain and extend the cartels which had become a characteristic form 
of business organization in the final monopoly stage of German capitalism. 111 2 Since 
history in the Marxist view is perceived as a scientifically predictable process which is 
subject to certain laws, it is therefore not surprising for Marxists that National Socialism 
11 Werner P. Friedrich. An Outline History of German Literature (New York, 1966), p. 
186 
12 Calvin B. Hoover, The Economy, Liberty and the State (New York, 1961 ), p. 161 
(• 
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came to power "in a highly industrialized country with important natural resources, a 
well educated population, and an advanced technology." 13 
The state encouraged historians in the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR), a country which had officially separated itself from the "Nazi past," to critically 
research the roles of business and the complicity of capitalist elites in the Third Reich. 
Hitler lived in a mansion, put his money in Swiss banks, and received royalties for the 
use of his picture on Deutsches Reich postage stamps. On the other hand, many of the 
former GDR elites, like Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, sat out the war in the Soviet 
Union. Unlike many leaders and elites in the West, they had not participated in Hitler's 
Reich and bore no burden of guilt. In the Soviet Zone, there was more of an official 
consensus that business elites were to be regarded as "class enemies". At least 
temporarily, elites found little encouragement to "restructure" in the East after the war. 
Contrary to the historians in the East, western historians have alleged that while 
industrial concerns are found to have used the NSDAP state apparatus to consolidate 
their domination of the domestic economy, the historical "facts" are far more complex. 
In fact, throughout history, an individual's ascendancy to dictatorial power has caused 
elaborate structural upheavals in societies. 
The late Tim Mason believed that all good history writing begins at the end. If at 
the end of the story there is the legacy of World War II which transformed the character 
of modem social systems, there, at the beginning, are the Oswald Spenglers, Bertholt 
Brechts, and Kurt Tucholskys who foresaw it. At the end of the story, the National 
Socialist state ceased to exist, a self-sufficient German nation state ceased to exist, but in 
its place were two new socio-economic systems. 
13 Ibid., p. 162 
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Incomplete as it is, any cataloging of representative works on the history of 
German big business "thrives in measure as the experience of each historian differs from 
that of his fellows." 14 For the most part, the historian's experience is not simply 
associated with the past in "detached contemplation, but is identified as a social process 
shaped by the class interests and affiliations of the individual scholar." 15 
In the absence of archival material from LG. Farben and other World War II-era 
German companies, I have searched out other primary sources such as the autobiography 
of a Farben executive; a post-war government documentation of, and commentary on 
Farben-dominated cartels: an excerpt from the Nuremberg war crimes trial of the U.S. vs 
Carl Krauch (a wartime Farben executive); wartime journalistic accounts of the activities 
of the I.G. Farben group; books by Adolf Hitler and Albert Speer; and numerous 
comments by German executives and other first-hand witnesses which are quoted in the 
more than one hundred secondary sources I have consulted in the writing of this paper. 
Depending upon their perception of culture and civilization, scholars have 
focused their attention upon questions which seem to be of greatest importance in 
interpreting the whole phenomenon. Two of my most informed secondary sources, Peter 
Hayes and Raymond Stokes are teaching history in departments of business and science 
and technology. Chief of the patent and cartel section of the Anti-trust Division in the 
United States Justice Department, Joseph Borkin was responsible for the war time 
investigation of the I.G. dominated cartels. His Crime and Punishment of!. G. Farben is 
an important primary source. 
14 J.H. Hexter, "The Historian and his Day," from Reappraisals in History (Evanston, 
Illinois, 1962 ), p. 13 
15 Anreas Dorpalen, German History in Marxist Perspective (Detroit, 1985), p.46 
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Joseph Borkin's basic agenda is to expose corruption at all levels of business and 
government. Supported by extensive documentation, Borkin traces the history of 
predecessor companies which would eventually become I.G. Farben, the world's 
production and distribution leader of synthetic dyesuffs during the first half of the 
twentieth-century. The author's narration includes relevant information of the chemical 
combine's participation during World War I, when the new technology of chemical 
warfare was made available. The former I.G. companies also pursued a slave labor 
program, which proved to be unsuccessful. The remainder of Borkin's book is primarily 
an account of the company's role in the economy of the Third Reich and the Nuremberg 
war crimes trials. 
In addition to Borkin's indispensable material, Josiah E. DuBois' The Devil's 
Chemists and Generals in Grey Suits also deal with a critical look at the alliance of Adolf 
Hitler and LG. Farben. DuBois, who was "chief of the prosecution staff for the I.G. case, 
... and deputy to General Telford E. Taylor," 16 is a valuable primary source. Although his 
books are an essential reference, the author does not adhere to scholarly standards. 
Unlike his colleague, Joseph Borkin, DuBois does not give recognition to his sources. 
Both books were written in the early 1950s and there is little emotional distance between 
the writer and his work. 
Relevant portions of general histories noted in my bibliography have been 
essential to my examination of business elites. D.G. Williamson's The Third Reich and 
Alan Wilt's Na=i Germany are brief narratives which cover significant features of the 
National Socialist State, while Martin Kitchen's Na=i Germany at War reflects the impact 
of Hitler's domestic policies during the war. Louis Snyder's Encyclopedia qfthe Third 
16 Borkin, p. 147. 
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Reich presents a definitive selection of historical information about the era. On National 
Socialist foreign policy, William Carr's Arms, Autarky,and Aggression offers a concise 
overview of government-business strategy during the first six years of Hitler's Reich. 
A classic general work on business and industry is the sometime controversial 
German Business and the Rise ofHitler by Henry Ashby Turner. On individual firms 
which co-existed with I. G. Farben during the National Socialist era, Bernard Bellon's 
Afercedes in Peace and War traces the increasing wealth of the company as the Third 
Reich grew in power. Along with LG. Farben, this leading arms dealer used thousand of 
foreign workers and concentration camp inmates as worker-slaves in their plants. 
Although not accepted by many scholars, William Manchester's The Arms ofKrupp is a 
ambitious study of the great steel empire. Until Hans Mommsen's 1056 page book on 
Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich becomes more widely 
available, the story of Volksv.ragen may be found in Walter Nelson's Small Wonder. 
Except for the narratives by Telford Taylor and others on the major criminals 
trial, there is no comprehensive book on the Nuremberg Trials. The 1947 and 1948 trials 
have received little attention by scholars writing in English. General works on Adolf 
Hitler are almost too numerous to recommend. Joachim Fest's Hitler is usually 
considered the "best" biography of the Fuehrer, but Alan Bullock's Hitler, A Study in 
Tyranny is also a classic. ,Hein Kampf is the major primary source since Hitler was not 
an avid writer. Other important primary sources of the era-include Albert Speer's 
memoirs of Inside the Third Reich and Spandau are worth a critical investigation. 
I found Volker Berghahn's definitive work on the transformation of Germany's 
capitalist system, The Americanisation of West German Industry I9~5-I??3 helpful, but 
at times, laborious. The main task of an economic interpretation of history or a historical 
interpretation of economics is to study "communities of life and kinship, of work and 
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vocation, of property and enterprise, on the side of their economic results." 17 Richard 
Grunberger's excellent Social History of the Third Reich and Karl Hardach's Political 
Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century provided a solid foundation of 
background sources for my research. 
Throughout my readings, there is no source that gave me a greater "feel" for the 
anger in the "Valhalla" of the 1920s, 1930's, and 1940s than Julius Streicher's 
publication, Der Stuermer. Its redundant depravity reflects more than an anti-Semitic, 
racist pornography, as historians suggest; Der Stuermer represents a canker on modem 
society. Although it is likely that this publication was not at the top of LG. Farben 
executives' reading list, its publisher did lead the campaign for the anti-Semitic 
legislation which culminated in the Nuremberg laws, from which major industrialists 
greatly benefited. Relevant articles in issues of The New York Times and Die Zeit were 
also useful. The World-Wide-Web also provided me with some source material, but the 
current confusion over the validity of massive historical information gathered by non-
specialists in the media and on the INTERNET has inhibited the scholar's search for 
historical accuracy and authority. 
In acknowledging further debt to those who have preceded me with prior 
historiography on German big business, and in particular I.G. Farben, it would be 
appropriate to point out what has already been written on the topic. Near the top of the 
list is Alfred Chandler's ambitious study of Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial 
Capitalism which traces the evolution of the modem industrial enterprise and its 
organizational capabilities from the 1870s to the 1970s. 
17 J.P. Stem, The Heart of Europe (Oxford, I 992), p.307 
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Although Marxist historiography has not inspired much interest in the United 
States, the important Western interpretation of German history by historians in the former 
German Dt:mocratic Republic is detaik<l in Andreas Dorpalen's German History in 
Marxist Per!>pective. It is a critical study of fundamental importance, particularly the 
chapters which discuss the era of state-monopoly capitalism. A collection of essays 
written by the late St. Peter's College historian, Tim Mason, addresses major debates in 
the historiography of National Socialism from a Marxist perspective in Nci=ism, Fascism 
and the Working Class. Also the East German accumulation of state archive materials 
which appear in their Braunbuch warrants a thorough investigation. 
Despite shortcomings with certain secondary materials, I was able to extract 
pertinent information from The Arms of Krupp, The Splendid Blond Beast, The Fourth 
and Richesi Reich and other works of controversial nature. 
III ELITES WEATHER THE STOMI 
Competition is an accepted fact, but so are collective business decisions -
if they are imposed by the right people. 18 (Ludwig Erhard) 
. When Bimy J. Mason, former chairman and chief executive of Union Carbide 
died, his obituary as reported in The New York Times noted that he had become 
increasingly prominent when his company's profits began to grow and when "he took 
issue with government attacks on 'big business' simply because it was big. "Size confers 
no guarantee of survival," he said, noting that two thirds of the one-hundred largest 
IS Edwin Hartrich, The Fourth and Richest Reich (New York, 1980), p 199 
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companies in 1900 had vanished from that roster in 1958. The top is a slippery place, 
and is just as uncertain for big business as it is for small business," 19 
Union Carbide, which solidly ranks today as among the nation's five-hundred 
largest industrial companies, "was a sprawling confederation of separate and even 
competing companies when Mr. Mason joined it in 1932."2° Chairman Mason might 
have been classifying Union Carbide's competitor, LG. Farben, in 1932, as one of those 
big businesses that had "vanished" from the roster in 1958. 
Throughout history, the wealthy classes, noble and otherwise, have shared an 
interest in preserving the social order in which they prospered. Frequently displaying 
their power as entrepreneurs through corporate managers of labor, they like to think of 
themselves as rugged individualists, who as 'super-intendents' of large national and 
transnational corporations, are pioneers for a progressive world. Although the masses are 
likely to perceive them as role models, in reality, they function as bureaucrats in 
command of large hierarchical institutions. 
At times, powerful conflicting interests cause discomfort at the top, but there "is 
no political class in history that has willingly and happily abdicated its possession of 
authority. "21 In most cases, controlling elites have already acquired too much power to 
be successfully evicted from their upper echelons of society. Ralf Dahrendorf has stated 
that since there are always those who aspire to such eminence, the fascination with power 
inspires a curious inventiveness. Power is "almost invariably surrounded by ideologies of 
legitimacy, which adduce tradition, divine grace, or the law in order to support the 
establishment of those at the top. These ideologies are, strictly speaking, instruments of 
19 The New York Times, January 9, 1997, p. A131. [an unsigned news story] 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York, 1979), p. 207 
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mystification ... that enabled them [the ditesj to retain their position despite all n:sistance 
and the onsiaught of modernity ..... 22 
Until the late eighteenth century, God or a divine being was often the medium 
used for legitimizing power. The rich and powerfui aiigm:d their assets with divinities 
and religion in order to maintain political stability, but with the "death of God" in 
nineteenth-century Europe, new belief systems were beginning to evolve. In part, due to 
the education of the European Buerger, political ideas "trickled down" and guided the 
political action of the masses while transforming material life. 
Although the members of ihe status quo still understood the world from its 
traditional perspective, they had to acknowledge the interplay of new ideas and 
ideologies in European political life. 'While during the past century the political 
environment assumed uneasy dimensions of discontinuity, the "traditional eiiie not only 
took the sting out of the aspiring bourgeoisie, but even managed to bind the growing 
labor movement by the speil of its ideology of legitimacy. ;; 23 
In Germany and eisewhere, it was beiieved that incentives to gain wealth were 
based on merit rather than determined by privileges bestowed by government. Wealth so 
easily translated into inequality and in opposition to free trade that capitalism generaily 
thrived during the National Socialist regime of the Third Reich. A.ccordingly, even with 
a major break and the fall of Hitler's regime, political discontinuities did not inhibit the 
survival of groups in Germany, particularly the administrative and economic elites. 
Characteristically, there are exceptions where elites have not survived dramatic changes, 
22 Ibid., pp 207-208 
23 Ibid., p. 209 
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such as in the Russian Revolution and the Maoist Revolution in China, but even then, 
some elites still weathered the storm. 
Politicians have always been eager to do the bidding of wealthholders. Prior to 
the sixteenth century, trading companies in Spain, Portugal, Holland, and other European 
countries relied on the armed force of the state to assert their control of markets in the 
New World. Governments supplied these armed forces, while big business obtained 
resources and markets. By the tum of the twentieth century, European companies, not 
governments, controlled most of the trade in Asia and Africa. At the same time, North 
America was also involved with similar enterprising adventures. While public opinion 
in the United States was condemning European imperialism, U.S. corporate interests 
were also seeking to expand their markets in the Pacific and western hemispheres. 
Today, the owners of wealth are still accustomed to using economic power and military 
force to enrich themselves at the expense of the state. 
All nations strongly protect property through laws. If political discontinuity 
occurs, measures are taken to restore order as soon as possible. Political discontinuities 
have rarely resulted in the complete loss of economic assets of the rich. By virtue of their 
inherited and economic positions, leaders of industry have had the income and ability to 
advance their interests in government. Since wealth is the cornerstone of the capitalist 
state, government bureaucracies provide opportunities for wealthholders with public 
service. 
In relation to these wealthholders, top level government officials generally speak 
a common language, having attended similar schools, but can nonetheless develop 
diverse interests and opinions. They may even appear to be politically varied, but while 
their political interests (or disinterest) may apparently contradict their upper class social 
type, their social position always seems to remain intact. 
Page 19 
The striking discontinuities of modem political and social development have been 
generated from a social foundation of "elitist economic determinism," a system of 
philosophy that concludes that certain people have been "chosen" to control the rest. On 
one hand, these "determinists" presume the existence of human freedom, but demonstrate 
that some individuals make better choices than others. Since the domination of one 
economic class over others is widely taken for granted in industrial societies, the 
beneficiaries, both organizational and individual, are often not held liable for the 
practices nor consequences of seemingly "impersonal" market forces. Given the unique 
business opportunities presented by worldwide armed conflict, such elites actively 
employ the cover of "national interest" to further concentrate their collective and 
personal wealth regardless of whatever politically expedient structural adaptations may 
be required of them over time. The role of big business during the Third Reich and its 
aftermath exemplifies this. 
Who are these elites who weather most storms of history? The terms 
industrialists, business elite, and financial elite, as used in this research, refer to the 
boards of directors and most senior management of the largest and most powerful cartels, 
companies and banks, plus the senior partners in law firms who cater to such clients. 
The German biographer and journalist Emil Ludwig commented on the role of this group 
in the Third Reich: 
With Junkers and university teachers, who are first of all to be blamed for 
the downfall of the republic, a third class joined forces: the leading 
industrialists. It was those Kirdorffs, Krupps, Duisbergs, Bosches, 
Thyssens, Stinneses, and Vogelers who -- at the people's expense -- made 
their profit from Germany's defeat. Long before Hitler this pressure group 
fostered rearmament, which provided their plants with profitable 
contracts. They also financed the notorious Freikorps, which was to form 
the nucleus of the new army. They supported the Black Reichswehr, and 
made possible those sinister organizations which murdered so many, two 
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cabinet ministers among them. In their laboratories new brands of poison 
gas were invented long before Hitler and sold to Japan. The I.G.F. 
(Farben) offered and later delivered its chemical secrets to Mussolini, and 
thus forced Italian chemical concerns into partnership. As early as 1931 
Herr Duisberg could openly declare that "only an economic bloc from 
Odessa to Bordeaux can secure Europe's world position. "24 
This sector has occasionally obtained public prominence through politics, but often 
remains behind the scenes. The United States National Archives in Suitland, Maryland 
contains a listing of about six hundred Germans who fit this description at the end of 
World War II; it can be found in the section identifying 'Names of Persons and Industrial 
Groups Affected by the Application of the De-Nazification Program' (1946). 
Political leaders such as Joseph Goebbels, Arthur Rosenberg, and Rudolf Hess are 
rightly associated as agents of the infamous National Socialist regime. Military leaders 
such as Generals Keitel and Jodi have also been vilified. Most analysts seem to agree 
that they deserved severe punishment or death for their crimes against humanity. 
Nevertheless, the business Gemeznschafi (community) of the Third Reich did not share 
the same level of legal Verantwortlichkeit as political and military leaders. 
IV. I.G. FARBEN AND THE NSDAP 
IV.A. German Industrial Growth and the Founding of I.G. Farben 
F uer wen, du gutes deutsches Volk 
Behaengt man dich mit Waffen? 
Fuer wen laesst du von Weib und Kind 
24 Emil Ludwig, The Moral Conquest o_(Germany (New York, 1945), p.121 
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Und Herd hinweg dich waffen?25 (Gottfried August Buerger) 
When Napoleon liquidated the Holy Roman Empire at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, it was the final blow to an area of German states that had not favored 
political and economic unification. Unlike France and Britain, which had moved forward 
into the industrial age with overseas trade, economic expansion, and capitalist 
accumulation, the "un-holy, un-Roman, and questionable-Empire" of backward German 
provinces had remained weak due to its lack of political and economic unity. By 1815, 
English goods began to flood the German markets and drove thousands of small, 
inefficient companies out of business. Three years later, a first step in the direction of a 
national union was taken with a tariff agreement among the German states; this was to 
become the forerunner of the important 1834 Zollverein (Customs Union) agreement 
which brought most German states together in a "common market" with the exception of 
Austria. Although the Zollverein was originally more agricultural and commercial than 
industrial, as the German states became more industrialized, duties were also raised on 
competing manufactured goods from outside the Verem. Nevertheless, due in part to its 
limited natural resources, German states remained economically backward until the early 
1850s. 
While aspirations toward national unification formed the dominant ideology of 
nineteenth-century German statesmen, philosophers, economists, and historians, it also 
prepared the foundation for Germany's industrial revolution. Germany's rapid rise to 
industrial supremacy between 1870 and 1914 disturbed the balance of political, military 
and economic power among European nations. With financing from the humiliating 
25 Jost Hermand, editor, Von deutscher Republik 1775-1795 (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), 
p. 129 
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defeat of France in 1871, Germany achieved political unification under the domination of 
Prussia. "Intoxicated with triumph, ... the Germans -- each one of them, could conceive 
the belief that all this had been achieved exclusively by their own talents."26 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had deliberately used successive wars as an 
instrument not only to unify the German states, but to mobilize German industry. While 
German industrialization focused on chemicals, steel, optical goods, and electricity, a 
modern banking and financial system coincided with the creation of joint stock 
companies. The alliance between the banks and cartels would play a leading role in the 
German economy thereafter. 
Germany had presented itself to the outside world as an authoritarian, militaristic 
semi-autocracy. At the same time, Germany began to threaten its neighbors' interests 
with its dynamic competitive drive toward industrial superiority. Carl Duisberg, founder 
ofl.G. Farben, summarized his formula for success: "The object of any amalgamation of 
capital and production units ... must always be the largest possible reduction in the costs 
of production, administration and sale, with a view to achieving the highest possible 
profits by eliminating ruinous competition. "27 Along with the general propensity toward 
national competitiveness, romantic cultural identification, militant patriotism, and a 
determined sense of pride in its "Germanic" work achievements, the young nation 
contributed greatly to the outbreak of World War I. World War l was one of the most 
significant "breaks" in modern European history. As Eric Hobsbawn has stated, it was 
felt to be the end of an era, the end of the world, made by and for the bourgeoisie. World 
26 F.M Dostoievsky, The Diary of a Writer, translated and annotated by Boris Brasol 
(Salt Lake City, 1985), p. 733 
27 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire (New York, 1989), p. 34 
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War I would also become the first act in a continuous tragedy that would include the 
inter-war emergence of fascism and Europe's destruction during World War IL 
In absolute terms, the defeat of the Germans in 1918 was deceptive. Although 
Germany was forced to accept the Treaty of Versailles and became a liberal republic, 
many conservative nationalists remained in positions of influence, serving as judges, 
high-level civil servants, military officers, professors, and teachers. These higher 
professional ranks remained the preserve of the old Imperial bureaucracy and were 
unsympathetic to the new republic, undermining its existence. For the post-war 
generation, they would become a reminder of the First World War as a failure of politics 
and society. There were simply not enough people in influential positions who wanted to 
see liberal democracy become a lasting reality in post-war Germany. 
Since World War I had not been fought on German soil, its transportation and 
industrial resources had been left largely intact. At the same time, several German 
industries were burdened by the confiscation of their foreign investments, including 
patents and licenses in the Allied countries. As late as 1912, approximately "ninety-eight 
per cent of the applications for United States patents in the chemical field had been 
assigned to German firms and were never worked in the United States. "28 In addition, 
German companies monopolized "eighty-eight per cent of worldwide production of 
dyes ... (of) the world market. 11 29 Nevertheless, by 1917, the U.S. Government had seized 
U.S. patents held by German firms and later sold them to U.S. companies like DuPont, 
Eastman-Kodak and Union Carbide. By imposing high tariffs, the U.S. was also 
28 David Noble, America By Design. Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate 
Capitalism (New York, 1977), p. 16 
29 Raymond Stokes, Opting for Oil (Berkely, California, 1995), p. 17 
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responsible for temporariiy blocking attempts by German firms to re-establish their pre-
war dominance in the U.S. market, particularly for materials such as organic chemicals. 
The German labor situation was also conditioned by the post-war problem of 
rampant inflation which was created largely by the government's method of financing the 
war. On the assumption that Germany would win the war, the government chose to grant 
generous loans and to increase the volume of paper money in circulation rather than 
paying for it from taxes. Only six per cent of the cost of World War I was met by 
taxation. Industrial elites had calculated that they could meet current costs of production 
and pay off all war debts with a cheap mark and by a coordinated effort to ruin the credit 
of their country. Along with reparations, the financial result for Weimar Germany was 
the steep deterioration of the mark, combined with a temporary loss of foreign markets. 
This financial burden, a real cause of the German discontent which eventually 
contributed greatly to acceptance of Hitler, also opened windfall business opportunities 
for international bankers, cartels and companies such as the Hugo Stinnes conglomerate 
and LG. Farben to profit by grotesquely inflating their debt payments.30 
After Versailles, the United States temporarily withdrew into political isolation, 
while Great Britain encouraged a revival of German hegemony in order to restrain an 
apparent French dominance on the continent. In 1923, Germany defaulted in the 
payment of war reparations to the French, and the French retaliated by occupying the 
Ruhr. The German mark became worthless and by August of the same year, the 
exchange rate inflated to over four billion marks for one U.S. dollar. In part, due to the 
fear of the spread ofbolshevism, financial intervention was in order. In 1924, the Allies 
appointed a committee of bankers to develop a program ofreparations payment. Headed 
JO David Marsh, The Most Powerful Bank (New York, 1992), p. 81 (loco citato) 
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by Charles G. Dawes, the resulting "Dawes Plan" arranged a series of foreign loans 
totaling $800,000,000 from dollar investors with proceeds going to Germany. 31 These 
loans were used to a great extent to create and consolidate the gigantic chemical and steel 
combinations of I. G. Farben and Vereinigte Stahlwerke, respectively. Industrial 
mergers have always had a tendency to eliminate smaller and weaker firms. In Weimar 
Germany, there was no exception. 
After the German mark was stabilized, LG. Farben A.G. formally established a 
merger of the nation's six largest chemical companies, Bayer, Lucius und Bruening, 
Hoechst, Weiler ter Meer, Chemische Fabrik Griesheim-Elektron and BASF on 
December 9, 1925. This merger created the largest Chem1ekonzern in the world. The 
Farben Group also quickly regained a strong position in the dye market in the United 
States. Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik (BASF), largest of the firms and already a 
major shareholder in two of the other Farben companies, led in reorganizing the industry 
to meet the changed circumstances of market competition. By the 1930s, "General 
Aniline and Film, the newly created subsidiary of the huge German chemical 
combination LG. Farben, had become one of America's largest chemical enterprises."32 
During this period between the two world wars, LG. Farben continued to spread a 
world-wide network of cartel relations, in which Farbenindustrie was often the 
dominating element in the cartels it entered. Through patent-pooling agreements and a 
wide network of "sales" agents, the Farben leaders were able to keep an eye on all new 
discoveries in other countries. Farben would reach its full corporate strength during the 
31 Eberhard Kolb, 17ze Weimar Republic, translated from the German by P.S. Falla 
(London, 1988),p.60 
32 Alfred 0. Chandler, Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Massachussets, 1990), p.173 
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Third Reich. LG. Farben and other cartels not only assisted Hitler in power after 1933; 
they also produced the bulk of key German war materials used in World War II. 
IV.B. What is Good for I.G. Farben is Good for ...... 
The important thing for industry is a strong state, a mighty and energetic 
government. (Carl Duisberg from his Lebenserinnerungen )33 
One of the key questions that every student of history must ask is what role has 
the state played in the economy and what role has the economy played in the particular 
state. In the legal system of the United States, a corporation has the legal "rights" of an 
individual. If there are legal rights, there must also be legal accountability, yet the 
corporation is an inanimate entity, run by stockholders and their corporate representatives 
or board of directors. In capitalist economic systems like the United States and Germany, 
goods and services are produced for exchange according to the dictates of the market. In 
the United States and in Germany, wartime experience has often set the tone for later 
close identification between corporations and the state. The close identification of 
interest between a McDonnell-Douglas and the United States is analogous to the close 
identification of interest between LG. Farben and the Third Reich. Thus, the question 
arises; who or what dictates the market? 
In the early 1920s, Germany was in chaos, in part, because it had failed to unify 
itself with institutions that were not solely the product of German efforts. With a need to 
create order, its national recovery was dependent on U.S. financial interests and monetary 
33 Roy Lewis and Rosemary Stewart, The Managers (New York, 1961 ), p.176 
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contributions. However, in just less than nine years after the Dawes Plan, the world 
would undergo a transformation with German industry at the heart of it. 
Books and articles have appeared regarding the role of big business in financing 
Hitler's rise to power. Yet many scholars have refrained from or virtually ignored issues 
regarding the vital relationship between German business and the National Socialist state. 
To what extent does business determine politics, and to what extent do politics 
collaborate with business? \.Vho really had the power in a modem society in which 
authority was divided between government institutions and the NSDAP? As Hitler 
pursued extremist policies, did his moderate supporters in industry continue to assume 
that the political rhetoric was unimportant, and that Gle1chschaltung with Nazi goals 
may be used as a means to an end? Massive public works projects lessened 
unemployment, and built an infrastructure for a prosperous wartime economy. Hitler's 
initial domestic and foreign policies were successful, emboldening him and German 
industry still further. 
In the same vein, the common European had entered the First World War with an 
adherence to authoritarian elitism, but when he left the battlefield in 1918, there was a 
sense that was given full expression in the generation that followed: a generation that 
would assert it was the "natural right" of the strong to rule the weak. For any nation such 
as Germany to accept subjugation and obedience was considered anathema. The master 
mentality, which had previously characterized the aristocratic and ruling classes, was 
now internalized by the common people. The Germans and other participants of the 
seemingly inevitable Second World War would tum natural moral values upside down in 
a struggle to overcome the humiliation of the lost war. In Germany, the bourgeois "slave 
mentality" of pre-1914 re-invented itself "beyond good and evil" in the nationalist 
ideology of Adolf Hitler. Action was still to be determined from above, but the 
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"Christian-humanitarian" world of pre-World-War I, was replaced by "a state of 
isolation, ... controlled and manipulated by a bureaucratic elite. 'Bureaucratic' in the sense 
that all spontaneity is denied, and that all action is mechanically determined by orders 
from above. "34 
At the same time, powerful elements in German society successfully prepared for 
a post-war re-organization period. German shopkeepers, professionals, and big business 
had not bought into the Nazi ideology entirely, particularly when it seemed to be at its 
end. Analysis of the history of these and other groups in the Third Reich reqmre a 
broader analysis than is possible here. 
While scholars have proven that it is possible to write about aspects of cultural 
and social development within a country without being specific about larger issues, such 
as its place as a world power or its historical background, there is no aspect of Germany 
under National Socialism that can have historical meaning unless it is also firmly related 
to the era. There are strong modem pressures to research a particular subject as not being 
part of a whole political, social, and economic system. Many scholars assert they would 
rather work out general issues in their specific studies. Nevertheless, the motives of 
business elites within the Third Reich, or for that matter any modem society, might not 
be so easily overlooked if we did not so often view systems of government as being the 
engine driving society, rather than a vehicle being driven. 
The Third Reich was not an anomaly. Its structure, citizenry, and modem social 
order with complex interdependencies did not, in an instant, simply appear on the face of 
the map of central Europe in order to campaign for death and destruction. Nor was the 
34 Martin Kolinsky, Continuity and Change in European Society (New York, 1974), p. 
93. 
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Third Reich merely a terrifying chapter in the history of capitalist imperialism. After all, 
it was Hitler who claimed to be a "National Socialist". In short, the Third Reich, in its 
need to extemaily impose norms of behavior which would be beneficial to their idealized 
state, depended upon the support of traditional enclaves of power to be enthusiastic 
partners. 
Modernization and economic development during the Third Reich was carried out 
under authoritarian direction in which big business eventually supported. "[I]ndustry 
held a significant leverage in both the (Nazi) party and the army, (while) business power 
was protected by Party and State: not subordinate to them. 1135 
Not bound to politics in the narrow sense, the enthusiasm that bound big business 
to National Socialism was a desire for stability, a stability which served as an inducement 
and rationalization which a society can offer for compliance for refraining from critical 
examination of its functioning structures. At the time of Hitler's rise to power, German 
industrialists were particularly fearful of the idea of a Communist revolution. Their fears 
were real, since "a leftist coalition of the Communists (KPD) and Social Democrats 
(SPD) could have held a higher percentage of popular votes in the critical German 
elections of November 6, 1932 than Hitler's National Socialist Party if they would have 
combined their efforts. A unified KPD and SPD coalition could have accounted for 
37.2%, while the NSDAP had 33%, a 4.2% decrease in popularity from the July 31, 1932 
vote."36 The combined votes for the KPD and SPD increased by 1.5% from July, 
31, 1932, and the November 6th vote and ironically equaled the highest per cent of 
NSDAP votes up until that time. German elites understood the possible repercussions of 
35 Kolinsky, p. 121. 
36 Alfred Grosser, Germany in Our Time (New York, 1971 ), p. 12 loc. cit. 
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a Russian-style communist revolution, particularly "with the ever more threatening ... 
large-scale political strikes spreading, especially in Hamburg and Berlin. ln these strike 
movements the mutually hostile, embattled comrades, the National Socialists and 
Communists ... worked hand in glove."37 German elites believed they understood all too 
well what a "communist" takeover would mean in Germany. On the other hand, National 
Socialism had less of an international heritage than Communism. Economic historians 
such as Gustav Stolper, who was also a liberal member of the Reichstag from 1930-1932, 
were mindful of this view. 
Nostalgia for a more primitive and war-like kind of society was found more in 
NSDAP rhetoric than in directives of its leaders to standardize and mechanize the 
country's labor. Competitive industrial efficiency was incorporated into the apparatus of 
the Third Reich in order to reestablish Germany's powerful pre-World War I industrial 
and military position in the world. These conditions "could be produced only by a step-
by-step expansion of the area of Central Europe under German control. Only the 
economic potential of a Greater German Reich, enlarged by annexations and the creation 
of satellite states,"38 could be self-sufficient and reduce its dependency against superior 
economic powers. 
Another measure taken by the NSDAP to promote a reassuring stability during its 
first few months was a decree denouncing non-Aryans and persons married to non-
Aryans as undesirable 'foreign' influences in the Thousand Year Reich. The NSDAP and 
the SS ( Schut=stajfel ), not the industrial and financial elite, initiated the the 
Aryanization laws as well as the Holocaust. But financial incentives to the German 
37 Gustav Stolper, The German Economy: 1870 To the Present, Translated from the 
German by Toni Stolper (London, 1967), p. 123 
38 Tim Mason, Na= ism. Fascism. and the Working Class (Cambridge, 1995), p. I 04 
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busmess community to part1c1pate m the persecution, d1spossess1on and later murder of 
Jews and selected mmont1es were necessary to gam the support onhe corporate 
estabhshment. 
Dunng his nse to power, Hitler courted many mdustnahsts, who sympathized 
with his xenophobic nat10nahsm, but corporate financial power m Germany generaHy 
perceived Hitler as a torce agamst tfte Bolshevik threat of a dommo-etfoct spread of 
world communism. At the same time, maJor industnahsts saw ill Hitler the man who 
would curb labor and provide them with lucrative government orders. 
The fascist movement m Germany emerged as a result of the pohtical, economic, 
and social crisis after World War 1. It generated an extreme anti-socialist, nationalist, 
imperialist, and racist ideology. On the surface, the political structure of National 
Socialism was marked by total control ot' the press and all information sources, massive 
propaganda campaigns, a single party system, and a dictatorial leader. At the same time, 
the NSDAP's attempt to coordinate all political, economic, social and cultural institutions 
of the Third Reich proved less successful due to the fact that various fascist leaders were 
so caught up in their ideological glorificat10n of "struggle" (Kampf) and competition that 
coordination between administrative units was most often lacking. lnternat10nal business 
elites opposed autarky and the bloc concept of German industnalists. "National 
Socialism presented itself to the elites across the Atlantic as a ruthless, expansionist, 
autarkic system, backed by German mdustrial cartels which had financed· the rise of the 
Nazi Party. "39 Hitler's regime pursued a policy of Gleichschaltung, a term used in 
electrical engineering which means bring into line or coordination; m this context, it 
meant that all organizations, including businesses, were to serve the state. The 
39 Berghahn, p. 39 
Page 32 
significance during the latter years of the Reich, of quarrels between business leaders and 
party officials over a proper plan for Gleichschaltung, was that it showed industry's 
preparation for post-war planning upon the dissolution of the Reich. Just as the Kaiser 
was replaced after World War I, industrialists presupposed that Washington would 
demand dissolution of the cartels, autarky and the bloc system, while German 
corporations could continue to remain intact. As in 1918, elites believed they would 
weather another national crisis. 
IV. C. A Meeting of Mutual Interests 
Man soil seine Wuerde nicht ausser Acht lassen. - Unter Moral verstehe 
ich das reele Produkt zweier imaginaeren Groessen. Die imaginaeren 
Groessen sind Sollen und Wollen. Das Produkt heisst Moral und laesst 
sich in seiner Realitaet nicht leugnen. 40 (Frank Wedekind) 
A price war is of benefit only to the consumer.41 (l.G. Farben to Winston 
Churchill, 1934) 
The efficient individual is the one whose performance is an action insofar 
as it is the proper reaction to the objective requirements of the apparatus, 
and his liberty is confined to the selection of the most adequate means for 
reaching the goal which he did not set.42 (Herbert Marcuse) 
Herbert Marcuse's observation in the "Social Implications of Modem 
Technology" hardly justifies modem man's compliance with the mechanistic process. 
He points out that the attendant whose duty is to keep pace with the process "supplements 
40 Frank Wedekind, Fruehlings Erwachen (Munich, No Date), p. 74 
41 I.F. Stone, The War Years 1939-19-15 (Boston, 1988), p.208 
42 Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New 
York, 1993),p.142 
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the machine process rather than makes use of it. "43 Typically, he must be directed in 
order to be mastered, and acquire the mechanical norms of those who put his efficiency 
to good use. Those dependent on the growth of large-scale industry can hope to assert 
their interests effectively only if this process can be effectively coordinated in a large-
scale organization. These "organization" individuals thereby cease to be isolated and are 
stripped of their self-interested pursuits. As a member of the crowd, acceptable impulses 
can easily be released, without personal responsibility This applies to both upper and 
lower ends of the social scale. 
Corporations and their agents have historically understood, "complied with," and 
directed the process that pursues profit even when that pursuit promotes seemingly self-
defeating or immoral ends. How else could one explain the sale of American scrap iron 
to Japan in the 1930s, after it had already invaded China? Why were there no economic 
sanctions against Italy when Abyssinia was invaded in 1935, and why did main 
characters, defendants in the most far-reaching criminal trial in history, receive such 
lenient sentences for their major roles in the Third Reich's slave and death camps? 
According to a count by Corwin Edwards, there were also American firms in the 1930s 
which "were suspected of helping German rearmament and of promoting a dangerous 
arms race. 1144 
In modem German history, government authority had, for the most part, 
supported the marked feature of German industry, the cartel. Industry and government 
were both suspicious of and feared liberalism and communism. At a time when 
corporations still claimed national loyalties, the struggle against communism, for or 
43 Ibid. 
44 Berghahn, p. 37. 
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against free markets, and the Depression promoted coliaboration between Farben and 
NSDAP leaders. This mutual interest often included anti-Semitism. 
Early in the Third Reich, there was an indication that the National Socialist 
government would favor the business community, since the regime did appear 
determined to implement its own form of cane! movement in which "[r]epresentatives of 
the cartels acted as efficiently within the Nazi bureaucracy as they had in their own 
organizations."45 When Hitler explicated his "socialism" by underscoring "the necessity 
of private property and of economic order based upon the profits system, individual 
initiative, and inequality of wealth and income, many were reassured that. .. if he 
achieved power, business would rule the roost. 1146 In realistic terms, the word socialist in 
the name of the NSDAP party did not refer to the nationalization of the means of 
production, but rather to requiring the economy to serve the interests of the state. 
"Business is only one function of the body politic."47 The government was able to take 
advantage of the disastrous conditions of mass unemployment and the Depression, by 
destroying the organizations of the working class, and subjugating it to NSDAP rule; an 
ideological image of a classless society was to be proved a fiction. Hitler's regime was 
shown to be concerned with implementing the Mittelstandsideologie no further than was 
compatible with the requirements of industrial preparation for war. 
It is obvious that the Third Reich's leaders were not so ideological in their 
thinking as to exclude from their Gemeinschaft capitalist leaders, or even "certain Jews 
(who) were officially classed as economically useful (wirtschajilich wertvoller Jude)"48 
45 Louis Snyder, Encyclopedia ofthe Third Reich (New York, 1989), p 179 
46 Lewis and Stewart, p. 176 
47 Adolf Hitler, Duesseldorf Speech to Rhineland Industrialists, January 27, 1932 cited 
and translated by Louis Snyder, Hitler'.\· Third Reich (New York, 1988), p. 60 
48 Grosser, p. 46 
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during the early days of Hitler's Reich. Party leaders may have openly revered the soul of 
German soil, blood, and folkdom, but in practice, the Third Reich was a modem 
capitalist state. The ideal social type was not the farmer~ it was the capitalist who could 
contribute most to the "greatness" of the state. In both the developed and the developing 
societies, the ideal social type is "the professional expert, who alone amongst the non-
proletarian classes enjoys ungrudged, unchallenged prestige and security. "49 
According to Perkin, this ideal human finds the "meaning and purpose in life in 
serving God or the Five-Year Plan. 1150 The economic results of these business 
celebrities who claim to be utilizing God or Five Year Plans are usually concealed under 
the auspices of higher calling to "public service," while they, themselves, are more likely 
to be involved with profits and power. For example, our way of life is more accepting of 
"white-collar crimes" such as large-scale embezzlement and corporate fraud, than the 
average petty theft. The "white-collar criminal" is almost always the recipient of greater 
leniency in the courts, because he or she "made a single mistake." It is easier to 
sentence a "common criminal" than an influential businessman. If the legal courts of a 
society pronounce the fraudulent dealings of the influential businessmen as acceptable 
behavior, it is not surprising that "Nazi" business elites were also granted leniency due to 
their unique positions in one of the most advanced modem societies. Nevertheless, it 
would be too easy to dismiss all business cultures as one and ultimately over-simplify 
motivations in the world of business. 
American scholars such as Henry Ashby Turner have asserted that Hitler kept an 
iron hand on business, and that business leaders were coerced into unquestioningly 
49 Fritz Stem, The Varieties of History (New York, 1973 ), p. 448 
so Ibid. 
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obeying the Fuehrer's will. Although these scholars have argued that LG. Farben was 
dependent on, and a mere instrument of the National Socialist state, industrialists also 
hated their dependence on bank creditors during the Weimar years. Financiers, 
"international Jewish finance - in the Depression - made businessmen so anti-Semitic that 
they failed to realize that the regime (NSDAP) intended to control and even ovm them 
too. "51 Industrialists blamed Weimar's financiers for Germany's problems too. 
But corporations in Germany during this period were not in business solely to 
make money or even mainly to reap large financial profits. Although there were 
multinational power struggles within the companies themselves, German business elites 
generally believed in loyalty to the nation, particularly when it was profitable. Baron 
Georg von Schnitzler, a Vorstand (managing board) executive for I.G. Farben stated the 
following at the post war Nuremberg Military Trials: 
"--[d]ass die I.G. eine Richtung verfolgen wuerde, welche nicht im 
Einklang mit der Regierung stand, war undenkbar, und <lass die I.G. von 
einem Befehl der Regierung abweichen wuerde oder die Haltung einer 
offenen oder heimlichen Opposition einnehmen werde, kam gar nicht in 
Frage, selbst damals nicht, als Deutschland ein demokratischer Staat war, 
in welchem Regierungsmassnahmen oft kritisiert werden konnten. Die 
I.G. war Regierungstreu unter Stressemann ebenso wie unter Bruening und 
Papen."52 
The l.G. was generally Regierungstreu during the Hitler regime too. 
Labor, too, was drawn into the Gleichshaltung. Influential labor organizations of 
the industrial Mittelstand were dissolved and their members were forced into the 
membership of a newly created Estate for Handicraft and Trade. Later, the Reich's 
51 Lewis and Stewart, p. 177 
5
2 HGST, "Ein Konzem steht vor Gericht," Die Zeit, February 12, 1948, p. 8 
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Minister of Economics, Hjalmar Schacht reduced the status of the organization putting it 
under the control of big business. At the same time, money was being pumped into the 
National Socialist regime. In open contradiction to the original NSDAP program, "the 
years 1933-36 saw a steady growth of cartels and the influence of big business over the 
economy - between July 1933 and December 1936, for example, over 1,600 new cartel 
arrangements were signed ... 53 
IV.D. The Rise of the NSDAP and I.G. Farben 
" ... without Farben, no foreign policy was possible."54 (Stresemann) 
The cartelization of German industry contributed to a bloc mentality. While 
perceiving the world in terms of closed blocs, entrepreneurs behaved almost like 
bureaucrats. "After the Ruhr steel industry, LG. Farben slowly began to tum its back on 
the world market. Speaking on 24 March 1931 (Carl) Duisberg seemed to be moving 
away from his internationalism when he talked of a 'closed economic bloc' from 
Bordeaux to Sofia. "55 After 1933, cartels became compulsory for the entire German 
economy. Although the state had the power to form and regulate membership in cartels, 
top cartel representatives and elites maneuvered as efficiently within the National 
Socialist bureaucracy, as they had in their own businesses. 
While it is not my purpose to investigate the hierarchical structure of German 
industry, it is necessary to clarify briefly that German companies are controlled by a two-
53 D.G. Williamson, The Third Reich (London, 1982), p. 28 
54 Josiah E. DuBois, Generals in Grey Suits (Boston, 1953), p.303 
55 Berghahn, p. 24 
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tiered board system. In keeping with German company law, there is a supervisory board 
known as the Auf<iichtsrat and an executive board or Vorstand. The Auf<iichtsrat or AR 
broadly represents the shareholders who in fact elect it, while the function 
of the Vorstand is to manage the company. As the name suggests, the AR 
is responsible for supervision. To it must be reported company strategy, 
turnover, profitability, liquidity, and any important financial matters at 
least four times a year. It has the powers to hire and fire the members of 
the Vorstand and to set their remuneration. It has the ultimate sanction 
over all major investment decisions, the closure of plants and takeovers. 56 
Third Reich law empowered the Generaldirektor (head) of the Vorstandto resolve 
disagreements among the board members by asserting his power and running the 
company his own way. However, it was not until 1966 that German law required the 
Generaldirektor to submit to the majority vote of the Vorstand. However, we are more 
concerned with the role of elites of the two-tiered boards during the Third Reich and the 
immediate post-war period. 
I. G. Farben was one of the most powerful companies in the world. It was 
aligned to 2,000 cartel agreements, had a share in three hundred eighty German firms, 
controlled five hundred firms in ninety-two countries, and manufactured forty-three 
major products. Its products were diversified to include dyes, oil, rubber, nitrogen, 
aluminum., and synthetic silks. Farbenindustrie had its own mines for coal, magnesite, 
gypsum and salt 
During World War II it controlled some nine hundred chemical factories 
inside Germany and in the occupied territories, supplied the Wehrmacht 
with eighty-five per cent of its explosives, and produced almost all the 
synthetic tires that kept the Nazi war machine rolling. It presented to the 
56 Anthony Rowley, editor, The Barons of European Industry (New York, 1974 ), p. 27 
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government an annual bill of at least one billion dollars ... (and) had at its 
command an army of scientists, industrialists, statesmen, spies, saboteurs, 
and conspirators. 57 
Its international cartel agreements were made to include such major corporations as 
Standard Oil of New Jersey; Dow Chemical Company; CDC - Continental Dye Cartel 
(Ciba, Sandoz, and Geigy); E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company; Mitsui, Japan; and 
second only to Farben in Europe, ICI - Imperial Chemical Industries of Great Britain. (In 
1932 ICI joined CDC.) 
As an example of LG. Farben's business connections, German channels were 
firmly established in the United States. Because of buna synthetic rubber, strong links 
were established between I. G. Farben, Standard Oil Company and Ford Motor Company. 
Ford Motor Company built a vast factory in Cologne, and used it to manufacture cars for 
Central and Eastern Europe. The concentration camp at Buchenwald would later provide 
slave labor for this Ford factory. 58 Although these German subsidiary corporations were 
not run from the United States during World War II, as has been alleged by some Marxist 
historians, it is true that "the German directors and trustees who did manage these 
factories during the war ... were to a large degree the same German bankers, lawyers, and 
corporate leaders who had been appointed by the parent companies in the U.S. to run 
these facilities prior to the war, and who often continued in their posts after the conflict 
ended."59 
During the Reich, National Socialists leaders asserted that the common interest 
must precede individual interest, but major corporations such as LG. Farben continued to 
57 Snyder, Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, p. 178 
58 see Christopher Simpson, The Splendid Blond Beast (Monroe, Maine, 1995), p. 96 
59 Ibid., p. 97 
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assume greater responsibility for the overall course of the German economy. Since their 
ideology pledged "the complete confiscation of all war profits, the nationalization of all 
combines (trusts) ... and [that]the great industries shall be organized on a profit sharing 
basis,1160 we can only suggest that the Nazi message was flexible and they did or could 
not deny sectors of the business community large profits. 
Schnitzler and other German business leaders in the Third Reich would have 
been in accord with the following statement made in 1981 by Konosuke Matsushita, the 
founder of one of the world's top fifty companies. "A business should quickly stand on 
its own, based on the service it provides a society. Profits should not be a reflection of 
corporate greed but a vote of confidence from society that what is offered by the firm is 
valued. When a business fails to make profits it should die --- it is a waste of the 
resources of society."61 During World War II, leadership in multinational German-
American businesses, such as LG. Farben, served the German state better than their 
American colleagues served the United States, but this will be more fully discussed later. 
LG. Farben was an integral part of the German power structure, and was 
connected to an even greater business community. It has been correctly argued that I.G. 
Farben would probably have not existed without the capital supplied by Wall Street 
investors, but an indictment against Wall Street is not the focus of this research. In 
1933, the immediate goal of Farben and other German businesses was to repair and 
expand the economy. Financial contributions from industry solidified the partnership 
between the Hitler government and certain business organizations. Farben executives 
also financed the National Socialist Government, but with the exception of a few elites 
60 H. Lubasz, Fascism: Three Major Regimes (New York, 1973), p. 78 
61 Neil Chesanow, The World-Class Executive (New York, 1985), p. 23 
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including Carl Duisberg, did so hesitatingly. In Germany, as in other capitalist countries, 
big business has always attempted to secure a market position through accommodation 
with those in formal positions of power. 
This position was enhanced through a gratifying relationship with government. 
The creation of the giant I.G. Farben chemicals trust by Carl Bosch and Carl Duisberg in 
1925 had been a result of proposals initiated as early as 1904. The senior executive at 
Bayer, Carl Duisberg, called for a nationwide merger of the producers of organic 
chemicals, shortly before Fritz Thyssen would unsuccessfully attempt the same proposal 
to organize a national steel trust. In 1916, the "little IG," the lnteressengemeinschaft der 
deutschen Teerjarbenfabriken (Community oflnterest of the German Dye-Works) 
combined in a single-industry merger. After the post-war inflation period, and 
stabilization of the German Mark in 1924, senior executives of member firms decided 
that a more centralized effort would be needed if they were to build up their 
organizational capabilities in Germany and regain their pre-war markets abroad. 
In October of 1925, all the members of the supervisory boards and Vorstaende 
(managing boards) signed a merger agreement which established a "big I.G." which 
consisted of "four regional Operating (Plant) Communities or Departments (the terms 
Betriebsabteilungen and Betriebsgemeinschaften were used interchangeably) and five 
Sales Communities. "62 By the terms of this a!,JTeement, each of the four 
Betriebsabteilungen was located in a different geographical area of Germany (Middle 
Germany, Upper, Lower, and Middle Rhine), but each of them came under the 
supervision of a central office. Later, a fifth Operating Community would be established 
with the AGF A headquarters in Berlin. In this way, internal competition would promote 
62 Chandler, p. 568 
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overall efficiency in a near monopoly, with Sales Communities in the following areas: 
"(1) nitrogen, (2) dyes and other dye by-products, (3) inorganic chemicals and inorganic 
intermediates, ( 4) pharmaceuticals and veterinary products, and ( 5) photographic 
products. "63 
While there was little need to replace outmoded skills and equipment in the 
chemical industry for the next several years, I.G. Farben entered a phase of limited 
rationalization and restructuring. There were to be no massive lay-offs or laboratory 
closings. Duisberg, for example, did cut the number of dyes produced at the 
Leverkusenfabrik of Bayer, but general policy was to make no radical changes on 
existing conditions. Relatively minor restructuring did take place, such as at the 
headquarters of the Middle Rhine Community. Hoechst took over the production of all 
chemicals made from acetylene, a highly flammable explosive gas, but in general, major 
laboratories continued to concentrate on much of the same product areas as they had 
before the merger, and indeed, since their beginnings in the late nineteenth century. 
Sales forces in the I.G. moved toward immediate consolidation after 1926, 
resulting in a 50% cut of the major sales agencies. At the same time, I.G. Farben's main 
products continued to be marketed from the same offices as they had been before 1925. 
Due to the restructuring and rationalization, policy and operating decisions could be 
made more quickly, and senior managers of this large merger "in the consolidation of 
sales, as of production, ... were careful to build on the highly developed organizational 
capabilities of the constituent enterprises. 1164 
63 Ibid., p. 569 
64 Ibid., p. 572 
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Although LG. Farben's dominance did not extend to all fields of the German 
chemical industry, as an export-driven industry production in its diverse markets and 
direct consumer sales compelled the cartel to generally support doctrines of economic 
liberalism. "Carl Duisberg and Carl Bosch, the two most prominent representatives of 
the firm until the mid- l 930s, advocated free trade and limited state intervention in the 
economy. At the same time, neither the industry nor the firm was averse to accepting 
government subsidies for projects (such as synthetic nitrogen) that permitted Germany 
temporarily to overcome its poor resource base. "65 In 1928, just before the depression, 
I.G. Farben's profits in the nitrogen business were estimated at 330 million Reichsmarks. 
"By mid-1932, I.G. anticipated losses of about thirty-three million Reichsmarks in the 
nitrogen business alone. n66 
After the onset of the depression, I.G. Farben sold at a loss to some countries, but, 
"Duisberg, the foremost spokesman for I.G.'s dyes and pharmaceutical branches, 
concluded that the firm's 'attention must return primarily to the internal market, which 
will always remain the backbone of our economy. "67 Determined to prevent a renewed 
collapse of international trade, I.G. Farben had, on the whole, still maintained "the twin 
pillars of traditional economic liberalism~ free trade abroad and free enterprise at home," 
68 even when faced with sacrificing profits in some markets. "This is also why the 
combine never split into two factions, one domestic-oriented and sympathetic to the 
Nazis and one export-oriented and hostile to the Hitler party"69 
65 Stokes, Divide and Prosper, p. 13 
66 Peter Hayes,lndustry and Ideology (New York, 1987), p. 35 
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According to Hayes, I.G. Farben's leaders held a common view that their 
corporation's fortunes depended upon the stabilization of Germany's currency and "on the 
restoration of German unity and power; that, in tum demanded patience and 
conciliation. 070 It was believed that their policy of patience and conciliation would help 
"generate the profits that powered the product cycles; the goal of corporate political 
activity was to retain an optimal share of those profits. "71 During this period, Duisberg 
and Bosch worked together for autarky and to strengthen primacy within the world 
market, in particular, with the United States. 
Dr. Carl Duisberg ( 1861-1935) and Dr. Carl Bosch ( 1874-1940), the co-founders 
of I.G. Farben, were fundamentally of different temperaments. Duisburg's son, Curt 
( 1898-1986) once wrote about his father and Bosch; 
Carl Duisberg (war) ein tempermentgeladener, organisatorisch sehr exakt 
denkender und sozialpolitisch besonders engagierter Untemehmer, Carl 
Bosch, Wissenschaftler und Techniker, ein Genie mit alien Vorzuegen 
und Schwaechen eines solchen ... Dies waren Gegensaetze, die hart 
aufeinanderprallten und die, so moechte ich sagen, in einer gewissen 
Hass-Liebe miteinander verbunden waren, die sich gegenseitig achteten, 
wobei der eine dem anderen half, wo er nur konnte. 72 
Before he became the first Chief Director ofIG Farben, Duisberg had been known 
as the "Begruender und Fuehrer der chemischen Grossindustrie in Deutschland"73 
Creating an industry in the 1860s that was rural in origin, the young Duisberg supplied 
7o Ibid., p. 48 
71 Ibid., p. 47 
72 Otto Koehler, ... und heute die gan::e Welt: Die Geschichte der IG-Farhen und ihrer 
Vaeter (Hamburg, 1986), p. 169 
73 H.J.F. Flechtner, Carl Duisberg (Duesseldorf, 1981 ), p. 6 
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textiles and dyes to weavers and peasants, fertilizers to farmers, and medicines to 
druggists. By the end of the nineteenth century, he had combined several large German 
chemical firms to protect joint interests in the export trade. 
Bosch, inventor of the Bosch magnet, was also interested in the nitrates that were 
a necessary ingredient in the manufacture of explosives. He had worked with Fritz 
Haber, in 1913, who invented a process for obtaining nitrogen from the air by combining 
it with hydrogen. This fixation of nitrogen process produced nitrates which are essential 
for fertilizers and explosives. It was one of the company's most important achievements 
in finding substitutes for critical raw materials which Germany lacked. Without the 
discovery of this process, Germany might have lost World War I within a few months, 
since up to this point, the Germans had to import nitrates, the essential ingredient for 
manufacturing explosives, from Chile. Bosch and I. G. chemists had also worked on 
discovering a less time-consuming way to make synthetic oils by using hydrogenation, a 
procedure developed by Friedrich Sergius, which converted coal into lubricating oils and 
petroleum for cars, airplanes, and tanks. Though synthetic oil was produced in quantity 
by LG. Farben, "it was impossible to market: the synthetic material was six times more 
expensive than natural oil. ,,74 
In July, 1932, it became apparent that the National Socialists, who had become 
the largest party in the Reichstag, had emerged as serious contenders to govern Germany. 
Carl Bosch, who at this time was I.G. Farben's chairman of the managing board, wanted 
to be certain that the National Socialists would maintain the late-Weimar government's 
policy of increasing import duties on oil, 75 particularly since the company's officials had 
74 Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York, 1996), p. 230 
75 see Stokes, Divide and Pro.\per, p.24 
Page 46 
been harassed by the National Socialist hierarchy for employing Jews. It was in Farben's 
interest to keep imported oil prices high in order for the corporation to receive some 
returns for their extensive investments in producing synthetic fuel. Newly discovered 
reserves in Texas and Oklahoma had saturated the petroleum market during the late 
1920s. Bosch sent Duisberg's press secretary, Heinrich Gattineau along with the 
technical director of the Leuna plant, Heinrich Buetefisch, who was also an authority on 
synthetic oil production, to discuss the situation with Hitler. At this point, Bosch did not 
want to go to Munich himself, but preferred to send Buetefisch with a "promising young 
I.G. employee with good Nazi connections. "76 Later, Gattineau recalled a meeting that 
turned out to be valuable: 
Auf der langen Bahnfahrt nach Muenchen habe ich im Gespraech mit 
Buetefisch mehr ueber die IG, inbesondere ueber die neuen Verfahren, 
gelernt als in meiner bisherigen Zugehoerigkeit. Das Gespraech mit 
Hitler haben wir, soweit uns dies moeglich war, vorbereitet. Wir beide 
erhoffen uns nicht allzuviel davon; denn die Nationalsozialisten hatten wir 
bisher nur als Choaten und Gegner kennengelernt. 77 
Gattineau, who would later become chief of the political-economy department of 
I.G. Farben's Berlin Northwest 7 office," ... had been the student of one of Hitler's 
favorite intellectuals, Karl Haushofer, the Nazi geopolitician. In fact Gattineau had 
written his doctoral dissertation, 'The Significance of the Urbanization of Australia in the 
Future of the White Race,' under Haushofer's direction." 78 According to Louis Snyder, 
Haushofer had already "won the reputation as the man behind Hitler. The Fuehrer would 
76 Borkin, p. 54 
77 Koehler, p.211 cited from Heinrich Gattineau, Durch die Klippen des 20. 
Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart, 1983 ), p.18 
78 cited in Turner, pp 248-9 by Hayes, p. 67 
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use the political aspects of Haushofer's geopolitics (expansion and Lebensraum) as a 
rationalization for national expansion. 1179 Haushofer was also the teacher and friend of 
Rudolf Hess. Eventually, it would be Gattineau, via Haushofer and Hess, who would 
arrange the meeting between the I.G. officials and the Fuehrer. Although Haushofer by 
no means had the power of a Goering or a Himmler, his intellectual credibility and his 
high-level contacts in both political and business circles made him quite influential. 
There is some question regarding the date of the first meeting between Hitler and 
LG. officials, since there was apparently no written record kept of when the meeting 
occurred. Joseph Borkin, who was a member of the prosecution staff at the trial of LG. 
Farben leaders at Nuremberg, concluded that the meeting was set "for early November 
before the election." [November 6, 1932]80 Peter Hayes concurs with Henry Ashby 
Turner's German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler, who places the session in June of 
1932 81 Otto Koehler also cites the German translation of Turner's work, Die 
Grossunternehmer und der Aufsteig Hitlers: 
Dass das Treffen mit Hitler im Juni stattfand, wie es in der Festschrift 
heisst, bestreitet auch Buetefisch nicht. Gattineau aber, der sich auch bei 
anderer Gelegenheit gem mal im Datum irrt, nennt mal den Herbst und 
mal das Ende 1932. Und wenn, wie er behauptet, die Angriffe von NS-
Blaettem auf die LG. die alleinige Ursache des Treffens gewesen sein 
sollen, warum hatte man dann mit der Beschwerde bis zum Herbst 
gewartet? Der letzte bekannt gewordene NS-Artikel gegen die LG. 
stammt vom Maerz 1932. 82 
79 Snyder, p. 140 
80 Borkin, p. 55 
81 Hayes, p. 67 
82 Koehler, p. 213 
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Die Konsumenten sind die linke Hand des gesellschaftlichen 
Organismus, die Produzenten sind die rechte Hand.83 (Erich Kaestner) 
Before the significant meeting of Gattineau and Buetefisch with Hitler, I.G. 
Farben had been targeted by National Socialists as an "instrument of international finance 
capital dominated by such well-known Jews as Max M. Warburg, Arthur von Weinberg, 
Alfred Merton, Ernst von Simson, Otto von Mendelsohn-Bartholdy, and Kurt 
Oppenheim. I.G. was [also] cartooned as 'Isadore G. Farber,' a grotesque caricature of 
Shylock, and LG. 'Moloch' an ugly reference to the Canaanite god to whom children were 
sacrificed."84 By the time the meeting ended, I.G. Farben was not only assured that the 
company could depend on Hitler's sympathy; Hitler also "outlined a program under which 
he planned to make Germany self-sufficient in oil with the help of l.G. 
Farhenindustrie. 1185 
While the National Socialists lost thirty-four seats in the Reichstag in the 
November sixth election, the Communists had gained eleven. Consequently, elites by 
"their opposition to parliamentary democracy and preference for an authoritarian 
system, ... accelerated the break-up of the Weimar Republic and played into the hands of 
the dictatorship. 1186 As mentioned earlier, executives like Bosch believed there was no 
reasoning with the Communists and feared their potential alliance with the Social 
Democrats, but Hitler appeared a sensible man with whom industrialists and financiers 
could reason. 
83 Kaestner, p. 71 
84 Borkin, p. 54 
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Many powerful business figures supported Hitler's Party after the November 
election; Krupp, Thyssen, Siemens and other elites. Other business groups which 
contributed funds to the NSDAP included the National Chamber of Commerce, the 
National Federal German Employers' Association, the National Federation of German 
Industry, and the Junker Herrenklub. Nevertheless I.G. Farben, Germany's largest 
corporation, did not finance Hitler until after Hindenberg appointed Hitler chancellor in 
January 1933. IfDuisberg, who was Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat (1925-1935) had been 
in Bosch's position ofleadership as Chairman of the Vorstand (1925-1935),87 it is 
doubtful whether LG. Farben would have waited until February 20, 1933 to pledge "four 
hundred thousand marks, by far the largest single donation. 1188 
Borkin's figures are extremely conservative. In his Wall Street and the Rise of 
Hitler, Antony Sutton lists the financial contributions by I.G. Farben to Hitler and 
deposited at the Hjalmar Schacht account at Delbrueck Schickler Bank between February 
23 and March 13, 1933 as $400,000. 89 On the other hand, The New York Times reported 
the following during the trials at Nuremberg: 
American prosecutors confronted I.G. Farben directors ... with their own 
records showing that they had contributed $12,000,000 to the Nazis from 
1933 to 1934 ... The record of Farben aid to the Nazi Party started with a 
contribution of 12,693,089 marks (about $4,500,000 then) to the Adolf 
Hitler Fund in 1933. The statement of one of the defendants, Georg von 
Schnitzler, was offered showing that Farben gave $300,000 to Rudolf 
87 "Membership on the supervisory board gives the employees a strong voice in overall 
company policy ... but does not involve them in detailed management decisions." See 
W.R. Smyser, The German Economy(New York, 1993), pp. 81-2 
88 Borkin, p. 56 
89 Antony C. Sutton, Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler (Seal Beach, California, 1976), p. 
110 Joe. cit. 
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Hess, then Deputy Fuehrer, three days before the crucial March 5 elections 
of 1933 when the Nazis swept into power. 90 
According to Borkin, Bosch had directed Schnitzler to pledge the 400,000 marks on 
February 20, 1933 too, but there is no mention of Hess at this time. Carl Bosch opposed 
anti-Semitism on both personal and professional grounds, and several Jews were among 
his closest colleagues, including Haber and "his secretary for the preceding fifteen years, 
Ernst Schwarz, the son of a rabbi."9 1 
Bosch and Hitler had only autarky and the welfare of I.G. Farben in common. 
When they did eventually meet shortly after the Reichstag election of 1933, Bosch 
"moved to the subject that his associates at I. G. had urged him to avoid. He warned 
Hitler that if Jewish scientists were forced to leave the country, both physics and 
chemistry would be set back one hundred years in Germany. "92 After this meeting, 
Farben associates managed to keep the two men apart, but Bosch continued to work 
against the expulsion of Jewish scientists like Fritz Haber from German business, and 
later from Germanv itself 
Although Hitler argued in the mid 1920s against the ascendancy of joint stock 
companies like I. G. Farben and their negative impact on smaller enterprises as a "sign of 
economic decay,"93 I.G. Farben was receiving "a state subsidy as early as December 1933 
to develop synthetic fuels at its Leuna plant. 1194 The National Socialist Government 
signed a deal with I.G. Farben: "the state promised to subsidize synthetic oil if the 
90 The New York Times, September 3, 1947, p.2. [an unsigned news story] 
91 Hayes, p. 92 
92 Borkin, p. 57 
93 Adolf Hitler, A:lein Kampf, trans from the German by James Murphy (Los Angeles, 
1981), p. 256 
94 Marsh, p. 140 
Page 51 
company committed itself to a four-year project."95 By 1943, Germany would produce 
over seven million tons, three quarters of all the fuel she used. 96 
Despite his enthusiastic pledges to solve unemployment and other economic 
problems, it is doubtful that Hitler had a set economic plan when he was sworn in as 
German Chancellor. Shortly after he came to power, Hitler did away with the laws that 
were designed to limit the cartels' strength during the Weimar Republic and made cartels 
compulsory for the entire economy. The state now had the power to force outsiders into 
existing cartels and to form new ones. Cartelization strengthened monopolies, and at the 
same time, placed no limit on corporate earnings, though dividend earnings were limited 
to six per cent. The Third Reich's eventual control of "important segments of economic 
life -- consumption, investment, and labor ... ensured that the armaments industries would 
expand to support Hitler's foreign policy. 1197 Representatives of the cartels acted as 
efficiently within the Nazi bureaucracy as they had in their own organizations. 1198 
Based upon a policy ofrearmament, Hitler's "Four Year Plan" for national 
economic self-sufficiency was not devised until the summer of 1936. The proclamation 
was read by the Bavarian Minister for Education and Culture, Adolf Wagner ( 1890-1944) 
for Hitler at the annual party rally at Nuremberg. "I [Hitler] today present the following 
as the new Four-Year Plan. In four years, Germany must be wholly independent of 
foreign areas in those materials which can be produced in any way through German 
ability, through our chemical and machine industry, as well as through our mining 
industry. The rebuilding of this great German raw material industry will serve to give 
95 Overy, p. 230 
96 Ibid. 
97 Peter Katzenstein, Polily and Politics in West Germany (Philadelphia, 1987), pp. 85-
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employment to the masses. The implementation of the plan will take place with National 
Socialist energy and vigor. But in addition, Germany cannot relinquish the solution of its 
colonial demands~ The right of the German people to live is surely as great as that of 
other nations ... "99 
The implementation of this plan was entrusted to Hermann Goering. In order to 
minimize dependence on imported raw materials, a major program to manufacture 
synthetic materials got under way. Coal was the one raw material which Germany had in 
abundance, and it was used to manufacture oil and rubber, two necessary materials for 
war. By 1938, Germany's industrial production would more than double the 1932 output. 
War preparation became a dominant fact of German economic life, and Goering would 
need to "utilize a labor force on behalf of the plan, justifying the practice on the ground 
that the German people were fighting for their very existence." 100 The Nazi methods of 
"utilization" would become most obscene during the next World War. It is important to 
also note that LG. Farben's Carl Krauch proposed a "first" four-year plan for the 
expansion of Germany's production of "domestic" motor fuel as early as September 15, 
1933. 101 It was in the interest of LG. Farben executives to increase government 
investments on production of synthetic fuels, rubber, and other materials, even though it 
could be up to six times more expensive to produce these goods than the real product. 
On the surface, this economic planning document presented the thesis that 
Germany could become self-sufficient in raw materials by investing in the synthetic 
goods industry. Although Hitler did not expect complete self-sufficiency within the 
prescribed four-year period, decreased dependency on foreign resources could be 
99 Ibid., p. 96 
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attained, and the German economy would be prepared for war by 1940 or 1941. "I thus 
set the following tasks: (I) The German army must be operational within four years; and 
(2) the German economy must be fit for war within four years." 102 At the same time, the 
German people and workers were being particularly inundated by terror propaganda from 
their own capitalists. Germans believed that if their country had to rely on foreign 
resources, the "inevitable" war would destroy Germany once and for all. In fact, the 
origins of 1936 Four-Year Plan reveal the nature of an alliance between industrialists and 
the Nazi leaders. "The document was written in toto by I.G. Farben aides who were 
supplied to Goering's office for this purpose. The massive propaganda campaign about 
autarky was merely a device to justify government credits to I.G. Farben for the synthetic 
goods industries - credits that Schacht had been denying." 103 
The Reich Minister of Economics Hjalmar Schlacht (1934-37) would eventually 
be forced to resign from his post due to his opposition to this inflationary process of 
rearmament. At the time the Reich institutionalized the Four-Year-Plan, export prices 
were unfavorable, and Germany did not have sufficient gold to pay for the increasing 
amounts of raw materials needed from abroad. The already over-inflated Reichsmark, 
the result of artificial pegging by U.S.-British bankers, had made "German exports fifteen 
to twenty-five per cent more expensive than those of Britain." I 04 Rather than a 
devaluation of the Mark to combat inflation, the Reich government wanted tight foreign 
exchange controls "through emphasis upon foreign trade with areas most likely to remain 
reliable import sources in times of conflict, such as Scandinavia, the Balkans, and the 
102 Louis L. Snyder, Hitler~<; Third Reich, (Chicago, 1988), p. 232 
103 Costas Axios, "Final Solution: The Schachtian Economy of the Third Reich," The 
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Near East." 105 Insulation from cyclical trade movements and the creation of a closed 
economy made "good business sense." 
Until 1936, Schacht had "eased big business out of the direct form of Party 
control that had been envisaged by the Nazi populists and Mittelstand ideologists." 106 
After the initiation of the Four-Year-Plan, another layer of administration and 
representatives of private industry was imposed on the German economy, as firms 
competed against one another for lucrative government contracts. There was no forceful 
leadership to overcome the confusions of authority between the ministries responsible for 
armaments and the military. Goering, who was up to this point the key political figure of 
the Four-Year Plan, was idle, and Walter Funk, who replaced Schacht as minister of 
Economics and in 1939, as president of the Reichsbank, was obligated to Goering and 
provided insignificant leadership. As one industrialist remarked, "business is not in the 
least bit concerned whether it is ruled by a tin helmet or a top hat, but it is time that it 
was decided which headgear would be worn." 107 
Although it is disputed whether LG. Farben or Hitler initiated the idea of 
Schacht's removal as Economics Minister, it remains a fact that the aggressive 
manufacturer of synthetic substitute products wanted him removed because of his 
opposition to an all-out conversion to autarky. Some East German analyses claim that 
Schacht, who called for a "slowdown in arms production and an expansion of exports to 
redress the balance of payments ... was acting ... also at the behest of American 'finance 
capitalism' to which he was claimed to be closely linked and which allegedly hoped to 
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retain, with his help, access to the German market." 108 One much-criticized agreement 
between Standard Oil and I.G. Farben left the United States with no synthetic rubber 
industry at the outbreak of World War II. The war was more than half over before the 
synthetic rubber problem was fixed. 
LG. Farben's development of synthetic oil and rubber, which had not been 
profitable in 1933, became a profitable venture. Carl Krauch, who had been instrumental 
in initiating government commitment to the development of synthetic fuels and rubber, 
headed the operation which "received an almost unbelievable 72.2 per cent of the total 
capital invested by the Four-Year Plan between 1936 and 1939. 11109 Government 
subventions prompted the combine to build new factories and to sign "additional 
marketing and product development agreements with Standard Oil in the United States 
and Shell Oil in Great Britain." I IO 
After 1933, capitalism was administered by the National Socialists, who disguised 
their acceptance of it by channeling ever more of its production into war material. Private 
property in the means of production remained, but the right to control privately owned 
property was severely limited by state regulation. Nevertheless, support for capitalism, 
private property, inherited wealth, and elites enjoying the fruits of these does not 
necessarily imply submission to uncontrolled market forces. Governments, including the 
National Socialists, have frequently pursued their objectives through subsidies to private 
enterprise, the regulation of markets and heavy state consumption through debt - in this 
case for rearmament. Franz Neumann wrote in 1942 that "the German economy today 
has two broad and striking characteristics. It is a monopolistic economy and a command 
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economy. It is a private capitalistic economy, regimented by the totalitarian state. We 
suggest as a name best to describe it, 'Totalitarian Monopoly Capitalism' ... the 
automatism of free capitalism, precarious even under a democratic monopoly capitalism, 
has been severely restricted. But capitalism remains." 111 Not unlike other capitalist 
machines, Hitler's totalitarian state maintained cohesion through patronage and "kick-
backs." 
At the same time, the German worker did not fare as well as his employers under 
National Socialism. Although wages and salaries increased, "the average weekly labor 
time increased from 41.5 hours in 1932 to nearly 47 hours in 1938. Thus the growth of 
wages is to be seen as the result of rising working hours. Wages and salaries as a 
proportion of national income fell from sixty-four per cent in 1932 to fifty-seven per cent 
in 1938" 112 Both the National Socialists and the monopolistic business interests had no 
illusions about the underlying hostility of the working class, and increased its 
exploitation. But it was precisely this class, the workers, that significantly extended the 
life span of the Third Reich. The socio-economic experiment of the National Socialist 
regime would survive until 1945; it would be different for the corporations like LG. 
Farben who gave life to this experiment. 
IV.E. Aryanization and the Changing Character of I.G. Farben 
The most important plank in the National Socialist program is to abolish 
the liberal idea of the individual and the Marxist idea of humanity and to 
substitute for them the folk community rooted in the soil and held together 
111 Franz Neumann, Behemouth--The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New 
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by the bond of common blood. This sounds simple, but it involves a 
principle which has great consequences. 113 (Voelkischer Beobachter, 
January 31, 1937) 
Let the facts speak. The department stores - which before Hitler's coming 
to power were the chief objective of the Nazi's anti-Jewish campaign -
have indeed changed hands. The Jews flew out, but no shopkeepers flew 
in.114 (Hans Behrend) 
No modern society and or the state it encompasses can exist and prosper without 
myths of some kind. Friedrich Nietzsche, who would probably have been offended by 
National Socialist myths, argued that "myths are indispensable to the ecology and 
survival of a community, for they form the horizon of its imagination, the measure of its 
ethical standards, and the scale of its moral judgments. "115 The attempts to heroicize the 
German national identity, folk soul or Volksgemeinschaft in a "post-heroic" era of 
Germany today is humorous and embarrassing to those who do not deplore its absence. 
Prior to the end of the Third Reich, the national myths which conferred a sense of 
mission based upon resentment, ignorance, and violence found support in the big-
business sector of the Third Reich's economy. In their "struggle" for profitable 
reorganization of German industry, corporate leaders gradually adopted the widespread 
policy to eliminate Jews from all business sectors. 
Aryanization expedited the shake-up of the German economy. "The elimination 
of Jewish ownership halved the number of enterprises in certain branches of the textile 
and clothing industries, while Aryanizers active in machine building, flour milling, and 
the shoe and leather trade were actually the first pioneers of larger than middle-sized 
113 Snyder, Hitler's Third Reich, p. 247 
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enterprises in the history of these industries.'il 16 In the chemical industries, I.G. Farben, 
which had been a target of National Socialist propaganda and harassment during the early 
1930s, supported Hitler's economic strategy up to the point where it would not undermine 
its own ideas of stability. With the exception of Carl Bosch, large scale enterprise 
leaders appeared to endorse the National Socialist strategy of eliminating non-Germans 
from corporate and public life. Gleichschaltung (coordination) and the Aryanization of 
all sectors of German life into a National Socialist machine presented a threat to the 
"monopoly capitalism" of business, but also provided them with opportunities for profit 
and expansion. 
I.G. Farben lost twenty nine members of their supervisory board and thirty one 
members of their managing board between 1930 and 1932. 117 Carl Bosch protested the 
forced dismissal of the Jews and warned Hitler personally that " ... we will work for a 
century without physics or chemistry." 118 As the older elites were dying off or were 
pensioned, a new generation sought favor with the NSDAP. "The Nazis and the activities 
they sponsored received some 4.5 million reichsmarks from I.G. Farben in 1933. This 
was merely the first installment of grants totaling about forty million marks by 1945 and 
nearly equaling all of I. G. 's other charitable contributions combined." 119 Within a few 
years after Hitler's rise to power, I.G. Farben was interdependent with National 
Socialism. 
In 1937, following the introduction of Four-Year-Plan subsidies to I.G. Farben, 
membership in the NSDAP was re-opened, "and almost all the members of the I.G. 
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managing board who did not already belong now joined up, including Carl Krauch, Fritz 
ter Meer, Georg von Schnitzler, Max Ilgner, Otto Ambros, Friedrich Jaehne, Christian 
Schneider, Karl Wurster, Carl Lautenschlaeger, and Ernst Buergin. (Hermann Schmitz, 
Heinrich Hoerlein, Wilhelm Mann, Fritz Gajewski, and Hans Kuehne already were 
members.)" 120 Buetefisch is not mentioned here, even though, as a member of LG. 's 
Vorstand, he ... "became a regular participant in Himmler's 'Circle ofFriends." 121 
Aryanization at LG. Farben had begun shortly after Farben officials had first met 
with Hitler in 1933, but in 1937, "all Jewish officials of the LG .... were removed 
including a third of the supervisory board." 122 Bosch was no longer at the head of 
Farben, but as a relatively inactive honorary chairman of the supervisory board, Bosch 
continued to speak his mind. He believed that war would be impractical for German 
industry, and remained, until his death, "the only German industrial leader who did not 
fear to speak his mind." 123 He was clearly "above the system" of intimidation by the 
National Socialists. Nevertheless, it is apparent that most industrial leaders at I.G. 
Farben were "speaking their minds" in support of the National Socialist government. At 
this time, LG. Farben's Carl Krauch was gaining special attention in the Third Reich. 
Krauch was the head of the LG. division that produced almost all of Germany's nitric 
acid. 
Krauch, who, surprisingly, does not have a separate entry in Snyder's 
Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, detailed an enthusiastic program entailing enormous 
expansion ofI.G. Farben production levels of nitric acid, in order to meet gunpowder and 
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explosives requirements in the "next" war. Goering and the NSDAP hierarchy bought 
Krauch's plan which "called for greatly accelerated expansion in synthetic oil and rubber 
and light metals as well as explosives, gunpowder, and poison gas." 124 
Krauch's resume included the following: "chairman of Farben's supervisory board 
of directors (Auf<iichtsrat); First head of the Vermittlungsstelle Wehrmacht (Farben's 
army liaison office); General Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of Chemical 
Production on Goering's staff; Eminent synthetic nitrogen and fuel scientist; Director of 
the Ford Motor Company in Germany." 125 Besides being an expert on atomic energy, 
Krauch had not divested himself as a professor at the University of Heidelberg, a 
university with close relationship with little and big I. G. during the Bosch and Duisberg 
era. A NSDAP member known as the Munitionsdiktator, who "verkoerpert die Einheit 
von Partei, Staat, und Interessengemeinschaft," 126 Krauch was, in the late l 930's, perhaps 
the most powerful industrialist in the Third Reich, to the extent that he, Goering's friend, 
had frequent audiences with Hitler and was the only person from I. G. Farben that Carl 
Bosch would see. 
Up until the end of his life, Bosch believed that "Hitler's lunacy would result in 
the destruction of Germany and the end of I.G. which for him were equal disasters." 127 
At the time of Bosch's death in 1940, Professor Krauch was elected to succeed Bosch as 
chairman of the supervisory board, giving up all managerial duties to devote more time to 
the plenipotentiary of chemical production on Goering's staff Hermann Schmitz would 
assume the position he had already held in name, Chairman of the Vorstand. Schmitz 
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also held titles of Director of the Bank of International Settlements, Chairman of the 
board of Directors of American I.G. Chemical Corporation, New York, and Chairman of 
LG. Chemie, Basel, Switzerland. Schmitz, who had belonged to the inner circles of the 
business community since the early days of the /nteressengemeinschaft, was uncle to 
another member of the Vorstand (managing directors), Max Ilgner. 
Max Ilgner was a descendant of a family of Prussian officers. Before he devoted 
himself to business administration studies in the early 1920s, he had "joined a Freikorps 
unit after the revolution had frustrated his own plans for a military career." 128 In 1929, 
Ilgner succeeded his uncle Hermann Schmitz as chief of the Berlin Northwest Seven 
office, directing LG. Farben intelligence, espionage, and propaganda. Shortly thereafter, 
Ilgner went to the United States to promote Farben's interests in America, under LG. 
Chemical Corporation. Within two years, "IGCC's board of directors included Walter 
Teagle, president of Standard Oil, Charles Mitchell, President of National City Bank of 
New York, and Edsel Ford." 129 I.G. Chemical Corporation would be later renamed 
General Aniline and Film, to avoid "embarrassment" of American stockholder investment 
in an LG. firm. 
In 1931, Ilgner, returned to New York to form 'Chemnyo' to handle the patents for 
LG. Farben's United States firms. Chemnyo's directors, sons ofI.G. founder, Carl 
Duisberg and Walter von Rath became American citizens to enhance business operations 
abroad, while Max Ilgner appointed his brother Rudolph, also a United States citizen, to 
manage both his patent office in Berlin and Chemnyo. In 1937, Max and Rudolf 
transferred the patent unit of American I.G. to Chemnyo. The American I.G. connection 
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brought together James Forrestal, future Secretary of the Navy, and former U.S. Attorney 
General Homer S. Cummings, both of whom were members of the board of Standard Oil. 
At this point, links between I.G. Farben and Wall Street became multifarious. Joseph 
Borkin and Charles Higham discuss the relationship in depth. 
IV.F. The Role of I.G. Farben in Slave Labor and Genocide 
The people in the city [Auschwitz], the S.S. men, the camp inmates, 
foreign workers, all the camp knew it. All the civilian population knew it, 
they complained about the stench of the burning bodies. Even the IG 
Farben employees to whom I spoke, a lot of them would admit it. It 
would be utterly impossible not to know." 130 (Charles Joseph Coward, a 
British prisoner of war in his evidence in the post-war trial of I.G. 
Farben.) 
The aim of German social and politicai policy "was to make secure and preserve 
the racial community ( Volksmasse) and to enlarge it." 13 l Although the first 
concentration camp, Dachau, was erected in 1933 to deal with large numbers of political 
prisoners, I.G. Farben's direct involvement with concentration camp labor did not 
escalate until its directors had knowledge of the war with the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, forced labor had been a prior option for businesses in the Third Reich. In 
order to "maintain and increase Germany's industrial mobilization known as 'military 
economy' ... and to increase her war potential," 132 a company was formed by the SS to 
exploit the labor of concentration camp prisoners: Deutsche Erd- und Steinwerke GmbH 
(DEST, German Quarrying Company) From 1941 prisoners at Auschwitz were 
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contracted from DEST and the SS by LG. Farben forthe production of synthetic rubber 
(Buna). Separate camps were erected in Poland for the exploitation of Jewish labor, and 
Jews arriving at Auschwitz (although not at other death camps such as Treblinka, 
Sobibor, Belzec, and Chelmo) were spared the gas chambers as long as they provided 
useful labor.1 33 
The concentration camps were a notable and increasingly important asset to the 
German war effort. In coordination with the National Socialist government "who used 
the instruments of modernity to pursue their reactionary, anti-modem aims," 134 LG. 
Farben and other Reich companies set up production facilities near poorer areas and 
concentration camps where labor was cheapest. Just like today's modem transnational 
executives, they focused their marketing efforts in countries where wages and prices 
were highest. Under the auspices of the Wirtschafts und Verwaltungshauptamt, 
prisoners, ethnic "undesirables," and foreign laborers were exploited by German 
industry. At the same time, the German industrial elites, at LG. Farben and elsewhere, 
denied involvement with mass murdering of non-useful laborers. Auschwitz, which was 
a collaborative business venture between LG. Farben, Krupp, and the SS, received Reich 
subsidies to build a large industrial park around it. There, the companies' personal 
departments sorted laborers on the railway platform to determine who would live and 
work and who would die. "Life expectancy of the Jewish slave laborer was three months 
in the factories and one month in the coal mines."13 5 
LG. Farben's management style was less than "mean and lean," it was criminal. 
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The commandant of Auschwitz (and elsewhere), Rudolf Hoess reported the following at 
Nuremberg: 
Seit 1934 hatte ich ... in der Verwaltung von Konzentrationslagem zu tun 
und tat Dienst in Dachau bis 1938; dann als Adjutant in Sachsenhausen 
von 1938 bis zum 1. Mai 1940, zu welcher Zeit ich zum Kommandanten 
von Auschwitz emannt wurde. Ich befehligte Auschwitz bis zum 1. 
Dezember 1943 und schaetze, dass mindestens 2 500 000 Opfer dort durch 
Vergasung und Verbrennen hingerichtet und ausgerottet wurden; 
mindestens eine weitere halbe Millionen starben durch Hunger und 
Krankheit, was eine Gesamtzahl von ungefaehr 3 000 000 Toten 
ausmacht. Diese Zahl stellt ungefaehr 70 oder 80 Prozent aller Personen 
dar, die als Gefangene nach Auschwitz geschickt wurden; die uebrigen 
wurden ausgesucht und fuer Sklavenarbeit in den Industrien des 
Konzentrationslagers verwendet.136 
Commandant Hoess, who in his testimony, portrayed himself as a perfectly 
normal man with outstanding professional ability, was himself executed at Auschwitz in 
1947 by the Nuremberg courts. "To him the business of exterminating Jews was strictly 
an impersonal, mechanical system with the precision of modem industry. His work was 
to him hygienic and clinically clean ... (and) his orders relieved him in his own mind of 
any personal responsibility."137 
At the same time, LG. Farben's leaders "spoke openly of the gassings, (and) 
wielded them as an incentive to work harder." !38 By 1943, the top ranks of Farben 
officials understood procedures at Oswiecim (Auschwitz). Friedrich Jaehne, who would 
be later found guilty at Nuremberg of "plundering" and sentenced to one and a half years 
in prison for his role in "plant development" at Auschwitz, gathered enough information 
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"while traveling on a train to Auschwitz to ask his son, an engineer in the boiler house of 
the Buna plant, whether gassings were taking place. He answered that this was the 
rumor." 139 The "rumor" had also spread to the offices of other top Farben officials such 
as Schmitz, Ambros, von Schnitzler, terMeer, Struss, and Duerrfeld. Their 
professionalism insulated the corporate elites and their company from the obligation to 
make social or moral judgments. Farben leaders and Hoess were not required to evaluate 
their decisions as long as the government financed their special "competencies and 
responsibilities." 
Corporate responsibility and professionalism has typically sought to benefit 
stockholders and internal leaders. In the Third Reich, a refusal to cooperate would be, at 
least, hazardous, but the degree of imperilment can be proportional to one's status in a 
society, and perhaps in relation to one's ingenuity. Nevertheless, in corporate leadership 
roles, there are more examples of Carl Duisberg, who ... "feiert 1933 mit der SA sein 
50jaehriges Betriebsjubilaeum" 140 than of Carl Bosch, who proclaimed Hitler's "lunacy" 
for leading Germany to war, and for destroying LG. Farben in the process. At 
Nuremberg, Heinrich Buetefisch, member of IG Farben's board of directors of synthetic-
oil and explosive companies in Austria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Russia stated the following: " ... Ohne die IG-Farben, inbesondere die 
IG-Produktion auf den Gebieten des synthetischen Treibstoffs und des Magnesiums 
waere es fuer Deutschland ausgeschlossen gewesen, einer Krieg zu fuehren." 141 
Buetefisch was also a lieutenant colonel in the SS. 
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Peter Weiss's documentary drama Die Ermittlung provides insight into the 
murderous collaboration of professionals within the Third Reich. Even though Weiss 
based his play on the later 1963-1965 trial at Frankfurt of eighteen former staff members 
at the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, he shows how active and passive participation in 
the Third Reich was defensible because all Germans did nothing but their duty. Just like 
the defendants who worked as administrators at Auschwitz Concentration Camp, there 
was the stationmaster of the railroad which transported camp prisoners to their death. In 
the same manner, medical orderlies who would lead the prisoners to the crematorium, 
were only doing their best, it was their duty. Duty also took responsibility for activities 
of LG. Farben's Vorstand and non-Vorstand managers during the Third Reich. Walter 
Duerrfeld, a non-Vorstand manager, was typical of professional ambition exemplified in 
LG. Farben's operations. 
Dr. Duerrfeld, who had been the chief engineer at the enormous nitrogen fixation 
plant at Leuna near Merseberg from 1932-1941, joined the National Socialist Party in 
1937. In 1941, he accepted a career-enhancing opportunity with Farben to look for a site 
to erect a new plant located near raw materials and a labor supply. He chose Auschwitz, 
Poland. Duerrfeld was appointed to build this structure and to direct its operations. As 
director of the industrial sector, Duerrfeld was responsible for thousands of inmates who 
worked and died on the construction site and in LG. Farben's mines. "When Duerrfeld 
was placed on trial in Nuremberg after the war, he told the tribunal that he had been the 
overseer of thirty thousand people, including employees and inmates, in a plant covering 
ten square miles. He couldn't be everywhere at once." 142 Although, the number of 
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'thirty thousand people' is extremely conservative, LG. Farben made the most of their 
opportunity. 
Despite the influx of putatively inferior foreign workers, Farben's sales 
income per worker in the core corporation was 580 marks higher in 1942 
and 806 marks higher in 1943 than in 1939; expenditures for wages, 
insurance, and social services had fallen by 407 and 194 marks per head 
respectively. Thus, at the height of the war, the enterprise was making 
roughly 1,000 marks more per worker annually before deductions for 
general overhead than when the fighting began. 143 
At all upper levels of LG. Farben's management team, personal responsibility for 
misuse, exploitation, and mass murdering was dismissed as management team's inability 
to know what was going on. Except for the Jews who were dismissed from the company, 
LG. Farben had access to top professionals who, by the time the war began, were 
concerned "more about the quantity of output than the income per worker put on it." 144 
... now that the formula for universal serfdom has been discovered ... there 
exists no social property, no living possession, no human being who really 
has or is anything. 145 (Moses Hess) 
Since no central agency in the Third Reich had been delegated to deal with the 
elaborate enterprise of destruction during World War II, collaboration in the war effort 
and Endloesung of ethnic and labor problems in the Third Reich was furthered by 
participation of functionaries in establishment entitie.s and organizations. The Reich 
Chancellery coordinated laws and decrees. The Interior Ministry defined the term Jew 
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and deprived non-Aryans of property. The churches supplied proof of Jewish decent, and 
the Education Ministry eliminated Jewish students, professors, and researchers. All 
ministries, chancelleries, and authorities in the Third Reich had a job to do. Each of 
them benefited by the acquisition of additional power and official authority, though some 
agencies, like the education ministry lost some of their students, professors, and 
researchers. At the same time, the Economics Ministry, which provided regulations for 
the acquisition of Jewish firms, represented financially profitable ventures for bank 
concerns and, firms such as I.G. Farben. 
Reich banking concerns, the Dresdener Bank among others, were profit-making 
intermediaries in the takeover of Jewish firms. Many retailers, wholesalers, 
manufacturers, and construction industries acquired Jewish firms for nothing or less than 
their monetary worth. Later, forced labor of Jews, foreigners, and other outsiders, 
provided substantial business profits for corporate leaders. The elites of I.G. Farben had a 
dominant voice in obtaining bank appropriations, as well as supervising distribution of 
conquered assets. 
After the invasion of Poland in 1939, I.G. Farben was as concerned in making 
long-term monetary investments in production, as well as in looting and exploiting every 
ounce of the conquered people and territories. "The influx of slaves for the German war 
economy had begun just three days after the Nazi invasion of Poland ..... Within a few 
months the number of conscripted slaves amounted to over a million."146 Many of these 
early conscripted "recruits" were Poles, who were left with the alternative of either 
starving to death or "voluntarily resettling in the Reich" 147 In order to pay for 
146 Axios, p. 37 
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construction materials and costs, I.G. Farben industrialists had typically borrowed from 
the German state, but Auschwitz presented odd opportunities for the directors at I. G. 
Farben. 
With the selection of Otto Ambros and Heinrich Buetefisch as respective 
directors of the rubber installation and gasoline plant at Auschwitz, LG. Farben's 
directors began to ascertain the possible financial rewards of Hitler's Drang nach Osten. 
The Soviet Union and Asia represented a potential new market for profitable 
exploitation, so the "directors voted to put up the funds to make I.G. Auschwitz a 
privately owned I.G. enterprise and to assume the entire risk. With almost no opposition, 
they committed more than 900,000,000 Reichsmarks, over 250,000,000 dollars, to the 
building of the single largest project in the LG. system." 148 There is some disagreement 
regarding total expenditures at LG. Auschwitz, as the "investment" figures range as low 
as "700,000,000 Reichsmarks, ... while construction work required 170 contractors." 149 
Rather than accepting financial support from the Reich government, LG. Farben 
leaders were willing to gamble their own capital because they believed that the 
Auschwitz project would also have boundless post-war potential. Adequate labor at 
Auschwitz, which would be arranged through government channels, was assured by 
Himmler and the SS. With the same mentality that ''respectable" contemporary corporate 
leaders relocate their manufacturing bases to utilize the most profitable labor force, slave 
labor minimized costs and maximized profits for I.G. Farben. 
For most slave laborers, housing was a wooden bunk in a concentration camp 
barrack and they had little clothing. A typical diet for slave laborers at the LG. Farben 
148 Borkin, p. 116 
149 Richard L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History (New York, 1975), p. 58 
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was potato peel or turnip soup. This "Buna soup" diet fed to inmates at Auschwitz 
"resulted in an average weight loss for each individual of about six and a half to nine 
pounds a week .... After three months, they were either dead or so unfit for work that they 
were marked for release to the gas chambers at Birkenau." 150 
In the early 1940s during the height of the Reich hegemony in Europe, directors 
and managers throughout LG. Farben developed a plan to dominate European chemical 
trade. In order to maintain higher profits, Farben's corporate leaders were firmly 
embracing the economics of a sort of neomercantilism. The firm's role in the Reich's 
social order, "along with the trust's use of slave labor and its unwillingness to recognize, 
criticize, or stop the regime's mass murder program, exemplified Farben's gradual and 
fatal emulation of Nazi policy and practice. 1115 1 In any case, firms exist to make money, 
and during the Third Reich, I.G. Farben and its leaders made a lot of money, while it 
"occupied the chemical factories of competitors in countries overrun by German armies 
and/or forced them to sign contracts advantageous to the I.G .. "152 The following table 
was compiled, and percentages calculated from Hermann Gross, 'Material zur Aufteilung 
der I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft' (Kiel: Institute fuer Weltwirtschaft 1950), 
Tabelle la. 153 
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(It is important to note that budgets for such expenditures as research increased in 
absolute terms, but did not in percent of turnover-the amount of business transacted 
during this time period) 
During this period after 1940, in which LG. Farben made extensive use of slave 
labor, concentration camp inmates, and prisoners of war, its directors "agreed to pay the 
SS one and a half to four marks a day for various classes of labor from Oswiecim 
(Auschwitz). The lowest rate was for children." 154 Typical blue collar workers received 
about fifty percent of white collar wages in the late 1930s. According to Wirtschaji und 
Statistik Nr.23/1938, the actual average amounts were 1,373 marks and 2,727 marks 
respectively. 155 German laborers in 1942 averaged an hourly rate of fifty pfennigs an 
154 The New York Times, May 4, 1947, p. 54. [an unsigned news story] 
155 Gruenberger, p. 253 loc. cit. 
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hour in Pomerania to 90 pfennigs an hour in Hamburg. The average sixty to seventy-two 
hours per work week by 1944 for priority arms industries was less than the LG. 
Auschwitz's requirements. Of course, cheap labor was not the only force mitigating an 
expansion of LG. Farben's profits; war was financially rewarding for Farben's corporate 
leaders. 
In Hitler's Social Revolution, David Schoenbaum noted that LG. Farben "made a 
home for itself in the Third Reich" 156 Resident corporate executives at Auschwitz, Dr. 
and Frau Walter Duerrfeld, the head of LG. Auschwitz, and Dr. and Frau Kurt Eisfeld, 
the head of LG. Auschwitz's synthetic rubber division, were often invited to the home of 
commandant RudolfHoess for social gatherings. Dr. Fritz ter Meer, LG. Farben's 
executive in charge of synthetic rubber and petro-chemical operations including at LG. 
Auschwitz, was also seen to feel "at home" during his frequent visits to the camp and 
other LG. plants. At Nuremberg, ter Meer did not 
express any regret about LG. Auschwitz after the war. When queried by a 
British officer, Major Edward Tilley, whether he regretted the experiments 
conducted upon concentration camp victims by LG. Farben's 
pharmaceutical subsidiaries, such as Bayer, Dr. ter Meer is reported to 
have replied that "no harm" had been done to these KZ (concentration 
camp) inmates as they would have been killed anyway.157 
Dr. Otto Ambros, chief of the chemical-warfare committee of the Ministry of 
Armaments and War Production and production chief for Buna rubber and poison gasses, 
was also an informed member of LG. Farben's Vorstand. Auschwitz commandant Hoess 
recollected upon his relationship with Ambros after the war: 
156 David Schoenbaum, Hitler~<> Social Revolution (New York, 1967), p. 157 
157 Rubinstein, p. 60 
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Ich sprach oft mit Dr. Ambros bei meiner Anwesenheit in Ludwigshafen 
im Jahre 1941. Nach meiner Kenntnis war Dr. Ambros mit der 
Verantwortung fuer die gesamte Buna-Herstellung in I.G. Farben betraut. 
Er besuchte <las Lager in Auschwitz waehrend meiner Zeit 2- oder 3mal. 
lch sah ihn verschiedene Male im Buna-Betrieb Auschwitz. 
Ich nehme bestimmt an, <lass Dr. Ambros sowohl wie alle anderen 
Besucher des Auschwitzer Lagers ueber die Vemichtung von 
Menschenleben in Birkenau Beschied wussten, da in der Stadt 
Auschwitz, den Bunawerken und der restlichen Umgebung des 
Auschwitzer Lagers von den Ausrottungen ganz allgemein gesprochen 
wurde. 158 
Thousands participated in the mass murders~ many also believed in the Final 
Solution of the undesirables and Jewish Problem. Responsibility was only duty. Since 
German business leaders felt justified in fulfilling their duties professionally, correctly, 
and efficiently, and concrete rewards provided an index for their actions, they would not 
have betrayed their country until the outcome of the war threatened to shake up their 
economic interests. Except for the Weimar era, German economic development had 
been one in which the entrepreneurial classes had learned to rely on the established rulers 
to look after their politico-economic interests. But when political leadership faltered, 
LG. Farben's leaders were prepared to protect their company and their individual 
profusion of power, whether it faltered during Weimar or in the Third Reich. 
IV.G. I.G. Farben: Preparing for Perpetuity 
Progress makes purses out of human skin159 (Karl Kraus) 
158 Koehler, pp. 305-306 
159 Karl Kraus, Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half Truths (Chicago, 1986), p. 122 
Page 74 
During the final phase of the war, the industrialists and the German people knew 
that the Reich was in trouble. "Die Arbeitszeit geht vielfach ueber das normale Mass 
hinaus und liegt im Durchschnitt bei ca. 56 bis 58 Stunden, einzelne Betriebe arbeiten bis 
zu 70 Stunden ... "16° Characteristic of this phase was a report made by the 
Regierungspraesident oflower Bavaria who noted on June 10, 1944 that, 
In manchen Zweigen der Industrie ist die Arbeitslast fast unertraeglich 
geworden. In den Eisen- und Stahlwerken wurde die Arbeits zeit zum 
Teil auf zwoelf Stunden verlaengert. Dabei haben viele Arbeiter noch 
Anmarschwege von fuenf bis fuenfzehn Kilometer zur Arbeitsstelle 
zurueckzulegen und muessen meist noch eine kleine Landwirschaft 
betreuen. Es ist verstaendlich, <lass eine solche Ueberbeanspruchung 
Missstimmung erregt ... Die Dienstverpflichtung deutscher Arbeitskraefte 
kann vielfach nur noch mit polizeilichem Zwang durchgefuerht 
werden ... 161 
The longer the war continued, it became clearer that German defeat was not only 
a possibility, but inevitable. LG. Farben's leaders perceived as early as 1942 that they 
would have to " ... try to minimize the effects of Allied policy in the event of an 
increasingly likely Allied victory." 162 I. G. F arben's leaders began planning for its 
company's future, not so much with plans of a victorious Drang nach Osten, but upon 
the assumption of German defeat. 
It is significant to note that the exhaustive use of slave labor after 1942 paralleled 
the sense of resignation among the company's elites. In order to avert the worst 
consequences of German defeat, LG. Farben transferred patents and other company assets 
160 Harald Focke and Uwe Reimer, Alltag unterm Hakenkreu:: (Hamburg, 1981 ), p. 168 
161 Ibid., p. 169 
162 Stokes, Divide and Prosper, p. 31 
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to Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, and South America. Particularly during the 
closing months of the war, a 
number of German tourists were seen ... with Spanish bankers and with 
representatives of the enterprises controlled by I.G. Farbenindustrie with 
their branches in Portugal and South America. The purpose of their 
discussions was ... (to) transfer the ownership of German assets to Spanish 
nationals in order to try to avoid confiscation by the Allies_ 163 
LG. Farben representatives made other moves to ensure the continuity of the 
corporation's enterprises in the event of an Allied victory. 
Carl Krauch denied at Nuremberg that I.G. Farben named a leading technician 
Ulrich Haberland the director of the Bayer group of factories in 1943 in order to ensure 
continuity of the director's position in the company's management. Since Haberland was 
not appointed to the managing board, Farben's leaders surmised that the Allies might be 
less likely to remove him after the war if Germany goes down in defeat. "He could thus 
serve, possibly with others, as ... a point of concentration for the reconstruction of the 
firm. Indeed, he was to become the leading figure of Bayer AG, which together with 
several other companies was formed from the broken-up I.G. Farben." 164 Haberland 
would be protected from punishment, and the Bayer leadership at Leverkusen would be 
spared. 
In September, 1943, there was another major shift in Farben's leadership. Karl 
Winnacker was to be appointed divisional director of I.G. Farbenindustrie Hoechst at 
Uerdingen. According to Winnacker, between 1941 and 1943, Vorstand member Fritz 
ter Meer had met with him frequently but "never spoke a single word concerning my 
163 Ibid., p. 32 
164 Berghahn, p. 59 
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(Winnacker's) personal future. 11165 Yet when Winnacker was appointed to his new 
position in 1943, "ter Meer regarded the matter as extremely urgent, and fully expected 
that I should start my new job in Uerdingen in a few days. "166 The plant at Uerdingen 
had been originally sold to LG. Farben in 1926 by Fritz ter Meer's father, but the ter Meer 
family still represented local power in the area. 
In any case, Professor Karl Winnacker, the Chairman of the board of management 
from 1952 to 1969 and later Chairman of the supervisory board of Farwerke Hoechst 
A.G. mused reflectively about his early career responsibilities at IG Farben: 
I occupied a responsible position in the LG. Farbenindustrie for a 
comparatively short period of time. I had started in the Hoechst works in 
1933. During my twelve-year career I had been employed as a chemist in 
the dyestuffs laboratory, as a process engineer, as departmental manager 
of inorganic production, and as divisional director. That I never reached 
the last milestone, the technical direction of Hoechst and thus probable 
promotion to the board of management of the LG., could be regarded only 
as a piece ofluck in 1945. Had I got that far, then, like my colleagues and 
superiors, I would have had to face the Nuremberg tribunaI. 167 
In view of the course that the war was taking, the forty-year-old Winnacker's appointment 
was intelligently planned by Farben's managing elites. 
Farben's third major subsidiary, BASF in Ludwigshafen, was not as meticulous in 
preparing for post-war continuity. Professor Karl Wurster, a member of I.G.'s managing 
board, the NSDAP, and later defendant at Nuremberg, had been director of the Upper 
Rhine group (BASF) since the 1930s. After his acquittal at Nuremberg, he continued 
service for LG. Farben as director of the Upper Rhine group at BASF. At the same time, 
165 Winnacker, p. 104 
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five of the eight members of BASF's managing board in the immediate 
post-war breakup period ... were employees of the Upper Rhine Group 
during the war. These included Wurster and his deputy Bernhard Timm 
(later chairman of the managing board). At least twelve of the fifteen 
members of the managing board at Bayer in the early 1950s had been in 
the Lower Rhine Group of the LG. and at least four of eight were members 
of the Hoechst managing board and were managers in the Maingau Group 
(Middle Group)168 during the Third Reich. 
I.G. Farben had begun to restructure its interests and resources in anticipation of 
the Reich's defeat. On May 19, 1944, Carl Krauch, Heinrich Buetefisch, and E.R. 
Fischer, Chairman of the Board of I.G. Farben met with top military and government 
officials that included Keitel, Goering, and Hitler to discuss the vulnerability of chemical 
plants to Allied bombing. Particularly concerned after the recent bombing of the Leuna 
works, the elite representatives of I.G. Farben countered Hitler's "stereotyped 
interjections such as: "You'll manage it somehow,' or 'We've been through worse 
crises" 169 with data supporting the precarious situation of their plants and the Reich. At 
the time, Hitler acknowledged their insights, "but a few months later, when the worst had 
already happened, he no longer wanted to acknowledge these insights." 170 In any case, 
it was obvious to the Vorstand at LG. Farben that the end of Hitler's Reich was near. 
Since LG. Farben had played a central role in the rise and downfall of Hitler's regime, 
dissolution of the cartel would become a strong possibility with defeat of the Reich. 
168 Stokes, Divide and Prosper, p. 183 
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IV.H. The "De-Nazification" of I.G. Farben 
We are the trustees of the most infamous and fraudulent bankruptcy in 
history. 171 (Theodor Heuss) 
There is also an undercurrent of Anglo-American upper-class hostility to 
the trial of war criminals; once begun, it would be almost impossible to 
protect financial and business opposite numbers in the Axis counties from 
punishment. There is a subtle international solidarity here that is not the 
least of obstacles to just punishment of Axis murderers and the men who 
profited by Axis crimes. l 72 (I. F. Stone) 
In his autobiography, Karl Winnaker, Farbwerke Hoechst chief executive officer 
wrote, "the collapse of the (National Socialist) state ... engendered an understandable 
breakdown of social order. Until then, the employees had been fairly disciplined .... (but 
now) accepted moral values had lost their validity and sacred ideals and principles had 
been dishonored with the result that conventional concepts of property and ownership 
became blurred also. 11173 In the same breath that he referred to the "lost" validity of 
moral values, sacred ideals and principles, Winnacker mentioned that many early Nazi 
party member "victims" "had recognized the true character of the regime, ... far more 
clearly and far earlier than others who joined the party at a much later date." 174 
Winnacker was not a party member, yet he was appointed by Party member 
Farben executives to direct Hoechst from behind the scenes as early as 1943. As foreseen 
by Nazi Party member, Fritz ter Meer, Winnacker would be classified as 'not accountable' 
for crimes against humanity and would be allowed to continue directing Farben's interests 
in a leadership capacity, since he had not held a position in the Vorstand during the Hitler 
171 Marsh, p. 27 
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years. Following the war, some Farben elites were held accountable for their 
unconventional methods to gain economic stability and success for their cartel, 
particularly during the final years of the Third Reich. 
De-Nazification measures were not evenly applied, were often ineffective, and 
were primarily a legal demonstration to show the world what the Germans had done. The 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal, which was the legal instrument the Allies used to denazify 
Germany, would only temporarily idealize a "just" world at peace. "[D]ie Nuemberger 
Kriegsverbrecherprozesse seien eine tragische Verhoehnung der amerikanischen 
Justiz." 175 The lost validity of moral values and validity of sacred ideals and principles 
which Winnacker discussed was not limited to only Germans. The allies that freed 
Europe of war in 1945 had become enemies by 1947-48, the period in which LG. 
Farben's corporate elites would be called to trial for its participation in the Third Reich. 
The I. G. Farben Case was one of twelve separate proceedings held before the 
U.S. Military Tribunals at Nuremberg in the U.S. Occupation Zone against citizens and 
officials of the German Third Reich. The authority for these proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal stemmed originally from an Allied Declaration on 
German Atrocities released in Moscow on November 1, 1943. Top members ofFarben 
industries were indicted by the tribunal for preparing and waging aggressive war, 
participating in a conspiracy to wage aggressive war, and other major counts which 
included crimes against humanity, plundering and deportation, enslavement and murder 
of large numbers of civilian populations, prisoners of war, and prisoners of occupied 
territories. The indicted elites included Carl Krauch, Hermann Schmitz, Baron Georg 
175 Tgl, "Nuemberger Recht," Die Zeit, January 22, 1948, p. I 
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von Schnitzler, Fritz ter Meer, Heinrich Buetefisch, Heinrich Gattineau, and eighteen 
other top-level employees. (see Appendix) 
Since 1940, the supervisory board of the firm (Auf5ichtsrat) was chaired by Carl 
Krauch. Under Aufsichtsrat supervision, the Vorstand actually controlled the day-to-day 
business and operations of I.G. Farben. Since Hermann Schmitz had been Chairman of 
the Vorstand since 1935, he occupied a chief position among the I.G. Farben elites. 
Schmitz, who was hand-picked in the 1930s by Carl Bosch to be his successor at 
LG. Farben, "was in charge of its foreign empire and the principal architect of the 
company's vast overseas holdings." 176 He had originally attracted Bosch's attention as "a 
bright young man in the War Raw Materials Office who had helped him (Bosch) secure 
the approval of the German Government for the building of the Leuna high-pressure 
chemical plant in the spring of 1915." 177 Bosch had also arranged for Schmitz to 
accompany him at Versailles representing the German Ministry of Economics, after 
which Schmitz joined BASF as its chief of finance and foreign operations. 178 
Besides his affiliation with I.G. Farben, Schmitz was also Director of the German 
Bank of International Settlements, Chairman of the board of directors of the American 
I.G. Chemical Corporation in New York and I.G. Chemie in Basel Switzerland. He had 
been well-connected to pre-Hitler Chancellor Bruening, who offered him a position in his 
cabinet, and U.S. President Herbert Hoover, with whom he visited at the White House. 179 
As a top-level Vorstand elite, Schmitz had access to inside government 
information and played a significant role in the expansionist policies of the Third Reich. 
176 Borkin, p. 165 
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At Nuremberg, it was admitted that Hermann Schmitz's office had contributed 100,000 
Reichsmarks to the Sudeten German Relief fund in 1938. The money from the chief 
member of LG. Farben's supervisory board was used to incite border riots eight days 
before the signing of the Munich Pact, which diplomatically endorsed a "return" of 
Boehmen und Maehren to Germany itself After the Pact was signed, Schmitz wrote 
Hitler the following telegram: "Unter dem Eindruck der von Ihnen, mein Fuehrer, 
erreichten Heimkehr Sudetendeutschlands ins Reich stellt Ihnen die IG-Farbenindustrie 
Aktiengesellschaft zur Verwendung fuer das sudetendeutsche Gebiet einen Betrag von 
einer halben Millionen Reichsmark zur Verfuegung."180 
Schmitz was no doubt preparing to expand into the Sudetenland, even before 
Hitler had made the final political agreement with Chamberlain to invade the territory. 
LG. Farben had counted on acquiring two plants owned by the largest chemical company 
in Czechoslovakia, Aussiger Verein. "Under the formula applied by Nuremberg laws, 
Aussiger could be classified as a Jewish company. Twenty-five percent of its directors 
were non-Aryan." 181 Within four years under Hermann Schmitz's leadership, LG. Farben 
had acquired Skoda Werke Wetzler in Austria and Aussiger Verein in Czechoslovakia. 
Both acquisitions were hostile, since there was no possibility that these firms desired to 
merge with LG. Farben. Poland and the small community of Auschwitz in Polish Silesia 
would be next on Farben's table. 
Implementation of the Third Reich's racial policies by LG. Farben reached its 
peak at Auschwitz. Having "assured themselves of the viability of the investment using 
traditional methods of business decision making, I. G. Farben's leaders decided in 1941 to 
180 Janis Schmelzer, Massenmord: ueber die Blutschuld der I.G. Farben. 
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establish a plant - primarily for producing synthetic rubber, methanol, and oil - near what 
was to be a factory for murdering the victims of Nazi racial policies" 182 Scholars such as 
Stokes maintain that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that abundance of 
slave labor in the area was a factor in the LG. Farben decision to build a plant near 
Auschwitz. "Auschwitz's marshy and malarial ground offered an inauspicious setting for 
a concentration camp, let alone a factory." 183 Although it has been argued that the 
"regime's insistence on an eastern location ... won Ambros over before the possibility of 
employing inmates emerged," 184 it is more likely that geography was a determining 
factor in locating the camp at Auschwitz because the "SS had plans to expand 
enormously a concentration camp nearby." 185 In any case, most scholars agree that "top 
officials of the chemical compound knew about the killing, and there is no evidence that 
they considered any course other than going along with the butchery." 186 The company's 
leaders constructed and operated the plant even when "the stench of the incinerators must 
have brought questions into the minds of visiting I. G. executives. 11187 There is no doubt 
that the human mass sufferings at Auschwitz and other KZs contributed to the process of 
capital formation which steadily increased Germany's productive capacity throughout the 
war. Although it has been argued that I.G. Farben had originally planned to use primarily 
German workers at Auschwitz, "on April 7, 1941, Farben and the SS seemed on their way 
to an excellent working relationship. [Auschwitz Commandant] Hoess and his superiors 
had promised to furnish ... basic materials to supply, train, guard, and help feed ... skilled 
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inmates, ... all in return for Farben's paying the SS three to four marks for each worker's 
nine to eleven hour shift." 188 
It would be naive to believe that Farben elites did not plan to utilize resources 
available at the Auschwitz site at the foundation of the project, particularly since several 
Farben executives also held top positions in the NSDAP and its agencies. Most 
noteworthy were Chief of Sales and Vorstand member, Wilhelm Mann, and Chief of the 
Commercial Committee of the Vorstand, Georg von Schnitzler, both of whom were 
members of the SA Heinrich Buetefisch, a lieutenant colonel in the SS was joined by 
Vorstand member Christian Schneider, also a member of the SS. These men and others 
on the I.G. Farben board were primarily actors, not reactors in the National Socialist 
state. Although historians disagree as to when the systematic killing of the Jews was set 
in motion, many agree that the operation began between the spring and summer of 1941, 
approximately the same time that I.G. Farben executives were discovering their 
"excellent" working relationship with the SS. 
Opportunism settled easily into the professional and corporate mind-set at I.G. 
Farben. Out of fear or national pride, many Germans could not abandon 
Verantwortlichkeit to their country during a time of war. At the same time, I.G. Farben 
reached its full strength in the Third Reich, but resolute financial ambition spawned 
complicity between corporate executives and the political structure. Business elites are 
traditionally initiators of national and international experience, and, not unlike 
politicians, formulate advantages in economic terms. Rather than taking an ideological 
or ultra-nationalist view of the world, business elites are generally more interested in how 
investments work for them. Unlike the military and the police who are generally held 
188 Hayes, p. 353 
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accountable to legal standards, business leaders are in a class of their own. When there is 
wrong doing, the judgment is less severe for white collar crimes, regardless of the results 
of the crime. 
Many believe that business transcends ideology, when in fact, business is an 
ideology. Business is a belief system which helps to structure how the world is 
understood and explained. These ideas or beliefs provide the basis for some kind of 
political action. The basis of a good business is the profitable business; therefore 
business leaders become molded by the economic ambitions they serve. Particularly 
under dictatorship, corporate leaders are forced to be pragmatic, which is nonetheless, 
their greatest attribute. The I.G. Farben elites had a significant understanding of the 
powers that molded the Third Reich. 
IV. I. I.G. Farben: Post-War Metamorphosis 
Also kaemen die Zeiten der Unwissenheit, in denen man anstaunte, 
wieder. 189 (Johann Gottfried Herder) 
The unconditional surrender of German armed forces took place on May 7, 1945. 
This day of unconditional surrender known as Stunde Null or Zero-Hour was not the 
commencement of a new Germany, but, rather a cleavage in Germany's twentieth 
century. By July of the same year, four Allied powers, the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Great Britain and France, took up their final occupation zone positions, however, 
disagreement among them regarding the purpose of occupation ultimately determined the 
fate of the German lands as a whole. Within half a decade, two semi-autonomous 
189 Johann Gottfried Herder, Von der Volksposeie der Voelker (Stuttgart, 1980), p. 73 
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German lands would be proclaimed under the leadership of the United States and Soviet 
Union: Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and (BRD) and the Deutsche Demokratische Republik 
(GDR). 
For most Germans in 1945, Stunde Null meant the end of the German Reich. 
Devastation of the German Reich led to a collapse of German social structure. As 
Voelker Berghahn puts it: " ... all Germans seemed to be equals ... No doubt despair and 
deprivation were widespread and millions thought there was no future. For others the 
end of the Nazi dictatorship raised great hopes and an optimistic belief in a new 
beginning." 190 
Within three months after Germany's unconditional surrender, Britain, France, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union awarded themselves a zone of occupation. Under 
Allied leadership, an attempt was made to replace the institutions of the Third Reich with 
systems that would follow the lead of the two major political contenders for world 
power, the Soviet Union and the United States. The majority of the Germans survived the 
first miserable and hungry years of the occupation, but tens of thousands of captured 
German soldiers were executed or disappeared in post-war Soviet concentration camps. 
Although exact numbers are unavailable, between 1,500,000 and 3,000,000 Germans 
were sent eastward by the Russians to help construct destroyed areas, or in some cases, to 
serve time in prison for their participation in the war. Most did not return. 
At the same time, it was not unusual for German soldiers to walk hundreds of 
miles westward in order to escape from their potential jailers, the Soviet authorities. 
Some of these Germans were also in danger of being indicted for war crimes in the 
informal setting of the countryside. There were other individuals and, indirectly, 
190 Berghahn, p. 40 
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corporations, who were indicted more formally, particularly at the military tribunals at 
Nuremberg. A consensus among the Allied governments did not officially exist to 
acknowledge the mass murders, atrocities, and war crimes against millions of civilians 
until "an agreement dated August 8, 1945, (was signed) among the United States, Great 
Britain,and the Soviet Union, it was decided to bring Nazi leaders to trial. The decision 
was subsequently endorsed by nineteen member states of the United Nations." 191 
The Nuremberg trials were intended to demonstrate to the world what the Nazis 
had done, but many of the courts were more interested in overcoming the devastation and 
putting the country in order again, rather than administering timely judgments for crimes 
against humanity, particularly in the business community. While political-economic 
objectives were eventually implemented by communist state-controls in the Soviet zone, 
the western zones, like Hitler, did not replace capitalism, since they realized that 
capitalist business and manufacturing interests were essential to achieving their 
objective. It is debatable whether the western military occupational authorities in the 
Reich were being directed by industrial and financial interests which, even during the 
war, had interlocking transnational connections, or the threat of communism. 
Unlike the period following World War I, when there was a sense among 
intellectuals that Germany had been victimized in the Treaty of Versailles by Allied 
greed, there was little pro-German sentiment, even among German writers and 
intellectuals immediately following World War II. Germans and non-German 
collaborators in over five hundred thousand cases were found guilty of various "crimes 
against humanity." Penalties for some "top Nazi war criminals" were reasonably harsh, 
but from the beginning of the process, United States military intelligence officials and 
191 Louis L. Snyder, The War (New York, 1964), p. 624 
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administrators "believed that a distinction should be made between scientists like 
(Wernher) von Braun, who had joined the Nazi Party and the SS for what Americans 
termed 'opportunistic' reasons, on the one hand, and the various German experts who had 
supported Nazism for ideological reasons or who had directly participated in 
atrocities." 192 
Besides important scientists like von Braun, other men who were "sensible," 
respected, and well-dressed were thought not to have committed serious crimes in the 
Third Reich. Collaboration with the Third Reich usually had a two-sided character. On 
one hand, for example, collaborators may have acted on behalf of National Socialist 
government racial policies, and still lay claim to having acted in opposition to Hitler's 
government at the end of the Third Reich. Such collaborators were also useful in 
undercover OSS operations . 
. . . Deutsche gegen Deutsche ist kein Weg zum Frieden. 193 (Die Zeit, May 
6, 1948) 
According to the Joint Report on the Results of the Anglo-Soviet-American 
Conference (the Potsdam Agreement) in August of 1945: "All members of the Nazi Party 
who had been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile 
to allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from 
positions of responsibility in important private undertakings." 194 Leaming the lessons 
192 Christopher Simpson, Blowhack (Monroe, Maine, 1993), p.33 
193 Fr, "Deutsche gegen Deutsche," Die Zeit, May 6, 1948, p. 1 
194 Richard Sasuly, J.G. Farben (New York, 1947), p. 267 
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from "failures" of the Weimar Republic, the Allies' first concerns of De-Nazification 
involved a determination to prevent a resurgence of all nationalist parties. 
Not only the nationalists, but all aggressive political activity was suppressed by 
the Allied Military Governments (AMG); even anti-fascist groups which rose 
spontaneously in a number of cities to organize local services and eliminate Nazis were 
outlawed in the Western zones. By eliminating the old nationalist right and postwar 
radical left, it was believed by some visionaries that moderation and stability would lead 
Germany to an ultimately democratic society. Some scholars have also suggested that 
the AMGs' intolerance of such extremist groups forced Germany to miss its chance for a 
genuine democratic renewal while they fueled the coals of the Cold War. 
During the Nuremberg Trials, German corporations were legally perceived as 
individuals. Firms, as well as certain individual elites, were also to be treated with 
special consideration. One of the most conspicuous was Daimler-Benz, the motor and 
engineering firm which was one of the major beneficiaries of Hitler's armaments build-
up. Unlike the post-war metamorphosis of I.G. Farben, Daimler-Benz has remained 
unscathed by the Nuernberger Prozesse. It continues to manufacture a high-status 
product, while being one of the Bundesrepublik's most powerful conglomerates. 
Daimler-Benz was a typical example of most German companies during the Third 
Reich, which tended to act as a solvent on moral and social traditions. Like most other 
important German firms; it made extensive use of forced labor between 1941 and 1945. 
"Twenty-four per cent of employees at twenty-two large German companies were foreign 
workers and prisoners by 1942." 195 At its peak in 1944, more than 37,000 civilian 
195 Bernard Bellon, Mercedes in Peace and War (New York, 1990), p. 241 
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forced laborers, POWs, and concentration camp inmates were employed by the 
automobile and armaments corporation. This was more than half of their work force 196 
Benz had also contributed much to industrial growth in Germany prior to World 
War I. As early as l 912, the Prussian War Ministry had begun to subsidize the 
production of large utility vehicles at a small Benz factory in the suburbs of Berlin. 
During the War, Daimler-Benz, a Wuerttemberg company with the vast majority of 
whom laborers were members of the Social Democratic Party, continued to serve the 
Imperial German Government. In 1918, the General Director Ernst Berge and a number 
of his associates faced charges of war profiteering, falsification of price documents, and 
treason. Nevertheless, Benz continued to be a "reputable" company, receiving an 
infusion of loans by the Deutsche Bank, even when profitability was tenuous. 
Some of Benz's plants were doing well. Even though car prices were low, 
Mercedes had been selling large numbers of trucks to the Soviet Union. By the end of 
1930, the firm was also at work on the construction of two-test model tanks. 
Nevertheless, layoffs and wage cuts in their Sindelfingen factory provoked the workers to 
organize mass meetings, and they attempted to assemble a strike committee. It is here 
that the National Socialists began to get a foothold in the factories. In 1931, about "one-
third of the clerk representatives at Daimler-Benz were.Nazis,"197 while the company, 
itself, was drastically curtailing its advertising in the SPD Vorwaerts and increasing it in 
the NSDAP Voelkischer Beobachter. 198 During the World War II, the company received 
slaves from Sachsenhausen, 199 was responsible for killing Jewish slaves in Poland, 200 
196 Ibid., pp. 230-231 Joe. cit. 
197 Ibid., p. 217 
I 98 Ibid., p. 219 loc. cit. 
199 Ibid., p. 242 toe.cit. 
200 Ibid., pp. 246-247 loc. cit. 
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and sent some of their profits to Switzerland. 201 Today, the Mercedes insignia, a three 
pointed star framed by a circle, represents "having made it." 
The star, which originally symbolized the omnipresence of the corporation in 
land, sea, and air transport, has played a prominent role in war and peace. During the 
Third Reich, the Daimler-Benz star became an all around arms conglomerate, building 
even torpedo heads and parts for Hitler's secret V-2 rockets. Even so, this prestigious 
corporation paid no compensation for its use of slave labor program until 1988 when 
"Daimler decided to give OM 20 million to the U.S. Jewish Claims Conference and other 
humanitarian organizations to ease consequences still ensuing from those times. "202 As 
a corporation, Benz has flowed with the tide and fit well into each of the German 
governments of the last hundred years. 
Gustav Krupp became too senile to be tried at Nuremberg, while the younger 
Krupp, Al fried, went on trial in one of the post-war tribunals. He was jailed on charges 
of plundering occupied territories and using slave labor from concentration camps. A 
member of the SS and the Nazi party, Alfred was convicted in 1948 and served three 
years of his twelve-year sentence. Two years after his release from prison, Alfried was 
allowed to return to his position as head of the Krupp firm with the stipulation that he 
would divest himself of his major interests. 203 This condition was never enforced, and 
the Krupp Works once again became the biggest steel producer in Europe. 
While the de-Nazification program in the East called for the shipment of capital 
goods to the USSR, the public roles of LG. Farben executives were to be assessed at the 
201 Ibid., p.239 Joe. cit. 
202 David Marsh, The New Germany (London, 1989 ), p. 19 
203 Tribunal .Judgment 7131148 Ntr 13231-13402, also see William Manchester, The 
Arms ofKrupp (New York, 1970),p. 760 
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trials in Nuremberg by other capitalist polities. Twenty-four executives would initially 
receive no more than eight years in prison for their part in the Third Reich, and the 
longest time served was less than a decade. "Im IG-Prozess wurden zehn Angeklagte 
freigesprochen, die uebrigen dreizehn ehemaligen Direktoren erhielten Gefaengnisstrafen 
von ein-und-halb bis zu acht Jahren. 11204 
For most Germans, the sentences dished out were arbitrary decisions made by the 
victorious powers. Due to the increased tensions of the cold war, the Allies were more 
preoccupied with rehabilitation of the country and restoring its lost economic strength in 
the face of a new Communist adversary than with criminal proceedings. This tendency 
was strongly demonstrated by the number of pardons and reduced sentences granted to 
criminals who had been convicted during the first post-war years. The LG. Farben trial, 
which ended in the summer of 1948, was on the cusp of this process. 
The successful attempt of the Allied governments to maintain moderation and 
stability in post-war Germany gave (entrepreneurs) a new state in which they could 
believe. The only punitive action which the Allies took toward these German capitalists 
(besides in certain cases, war guilt), was "to take over his industrial secrets and know-
how, to fix a ceiling on certain types of production, and to break up the great 
concentrations in industry, especially in the Ruhr, in the belief that these great 
concentrations of power had worked for war and had enabled Hitler to wage it 
successfully. 11205 
"After World War II, all of the LG. Farben confiscated patents became the 
property of the American chemical concerns, which thus saved many years of costly 
204 AB., "Wochenuebersicht," Die Zeit, August 5, 1948, p. 7 
205 Lewis and Stewart, p. 178 
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research. Successors of I.G. Farben had to start again at scratch after the war and 
overtake all competitors, to be able to offer the world market new products to compete 
for a foothold. 11206 The role of I.G. Farben may have been limited in bringing the 
National Socialists to power, but the firm had thoroughly supported the regime once it 
came into power. 
Not only would I.G. Farben lose their patents, proponents of American policy 
immediately at the end of the war proposed a radical plan to deconcentrate the company. 
The Allied deconcentration program was not limited to I.G. Farben's holdings, but was to 
have been "carried out in three major sectors: breaking up of the large coal and steel 
combines of the Ruhr~ the survivors of the Big Six commercial banks, and the giant LG. 
Farben trust - the world's largest chemical firm. In order to discourage German industry 
from future world-conquest opportunities, deconcentration of LG. Farben was to create 
smaller companies out of the subsidiaries of the giant chemical cartel. At the end of the 
World War II in 1945, "about sixty per cent of the production capacity of LG. Farben was 
located in the Russian zone, twenty per cent in the French zone, eleven per cent in the 
British zone and nine per cent in the U.S. zone. rr207 
However, as the Allies poured money into the defeated country, strong 
entrepreneurs were given a chance to realign themselves in a new world order. Though 
structural changes had to be implemented, German business would emerge as the real 
architect of the post-war Wirtschaftswunder, at least in the West. In no company is that 
more evident than in the dismantled LG. Farben .. Although the LG. Farben name has 
"vanished," a sprawling confederation of separate companies have metamorphosed from 
206 TheNew York Times, July 26, 1952, p. 26. [an unsigned news story] 
207 Hartrich, p. 88 
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the larva of the German chemical giant. Today, the three major successor companies of 
LG. Farben - Bayer-Leverkusen, Farbewerke Hoechst, and BASF of Ludwigshafen - are 
each bigger than that their parent I. G. Farben ever was. 11208 While the surviving political 
and military elites were rushed off to the gallows or to prison to serve life sentences for 
their collaboration with the genocidal regime, the outcome of the denazifying of business 
enterprises was less clearly defined. 
Indeed, attempts to dismantle I.G. Farben did not fully succeed until ten years 
after the war; by then, its offspring companies were beginning to participate fully in 
world trade. General Order Number 2, issued by the AMG authorities to liquidate I. G. 
Farbenindustrie AG, was to become effective on July 5, 1945.(see Appendix) In 
accordance with American Military Government, the Potsdam Agreement was signed, 
taking into account measures by which 'Nazism would be extirpated' 209 On September 
19, 1945, writing in The Nation, journalist LF. Stone observed: 
Hardly a day passes without new evidence that.. .directives are being 
sabotaged by the military occupation authorities in the Reich. Big 
American industrial and financial interests interlock with those of 
Germany as of Japan. Their influence, plus brass-hat mulishness, is 
enough to nullify the most specific directives. For Germany, these are 
severe and thorough, but that has not kept them from being ignored. Even 
so conspicuous a malefactor as LG. Farben is successfully evading the fate 
decreed for it. I have seen secret General Order No. 2 on I.G. Farben, 
issued last July 5 by Military Government authorities. It is very drastic, 
but it is not being obeyed. Instead of being liquidated in accordance with 
the order, I.G. is being rebuilt. I am reliably informed that the services of 
its old American subsidiary, General Aniline and Film, are being enlisted 
to provide technicians for the reconstruction of the parent German 
company. Only last Friday the United States reported from Frankfurt a 
press conference in which Colonel James Boyd, head of the United States 
208 Hartrich, p. 87 
209 see Sasuly, p. 266 
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Forces Industry Branch, declared that I.G. Farben's war industries would 
be 'switched' to peace-time output rather than be destroyed ... .If I.G. can 
thus save itself, so can Mitsui.210 (Mitsui did save itself!) 
The Allied Military Government's written objectives regarding de-Nazification, as 
well as sections in the Potsdam Agreement, were obscured from the beginning. General 
antagonisms made it impossible for the four-power Allied Control Council to enact 
unanimous decisions regarding its prescribed reconstruction and de-Nazification. From 
the start it had been Washington's plan to rehabilitate survivors of the National Socialist 
state by eradicating "weapons of economic warfare ... German cartels (which) were 
utilized by the Nazis as government instruments to achieve political ends."211 Even 
among I.G. Farben executives who had begun to restructure management elites and 
protect corporate hierarchy for the sake of continuity, years before the war ended, there 
had been a sense that the cartel would be convicted of wrong doing during the war and 
broken up But after the AMG ordered its dissolution, I.G. Farben stock began to 
reappear on the stock market. It turned out that I.G. Farben would outlive its own burial. 
Investigations into LG. Farben's operations determined that a "Colonel Edwin S. Pillsbury 
had been set up to take special care that I.G. Farben should not be rebuilt.. .. except as may 
be specifically determined to be in accordance with the objectives of the United 
Nations. "212 In line with the United Nation's "objectives," I.G. Farben had resumed 
production in plants throughout the U. S. Zone, under the direction of General Dwight 
Eisenhower. 
210 Stone, p. 319 
211 The New York Times, September 9, 1944, p. IO. [an unsigned news story] 
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During this early "de-nazification" period, the "Germans' requests for production 
authorizations were always approved, sometimes even boosted,"213 Democratization of 
the German economy was Washington's particular plan to coordinate post-war 
rehabilitation. Generally, the occupying powers in the West had "failed to deal with the 
roots of German militarism -- capitalism and large-scale land ownership,"214 while they, 
themselves began to align with their former enemy. 
While for the next three years, the Soviet Union indiscriminately dismantled their 
production capacity of LG. Farben and other industrial plants, the forty-three 
manufacturing plants belonging to I.G. Farben in the U.S. zone were positioned to be 
utilized for the successor companies of the chemical giant. The initial concern of the 
occupation authorities in the U.S. zone was to break up the large combine and 
deconcentrate control over production in a manner similar to U.S. anti-trusts laws. But 
as the cold war intensified, the deconcentration policy lost its initial appeal to the 
occupation forces. 
In order for western Europe to be strong, Germany had to be strong. As a result, 
the original deconcentration list for LG. Farben 
was revised to forty-two successor companies, then to twelve units, and 
finally to five - leaving virtually intact the physical establishments of 
Bayer-Leverkusen, Farbwerk Hoechst, and BASF at Ludwigshafen, plus 
two smaller firms, Chemische Werke Huels and Cassella Farbwerke 
Mainkur of Frankfurt. Farben stockholders received nine new shares in a 
successor firm for ten old shares. 215 
213 Ibid, p. 199 
214 Dorpalen, p. 487 
215 Ibid., p. 89 
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It could be claimed that the Western Allies' policy of dismantlement aimed at LG. 
Farben was eventually successful because the old chemical trust was broken up. 
Nevertheless, I.G. Farben's 'dismantled pieces re-emerged in a form not very different 
from the old cartel, and with many of the same people directing it.(see appendix) 
In 1951, Konrad Adenauer's Christian Democratic government reestablished West 
Germany's standing in the world by offering financial payments to individuals and 
families of Jews and other groups who had been persecuted and killed by Hitler's regime. 
Six years after the Adenauer government decided to pay this restitution, the receivers of 
the twelve component parts of I.G. Farben "paid DM 30 million to the United States 
Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany in compensation for the 
company's treatment of Auschwitz prisoners. "216 In order for the restitution to be not 
interpreted as an admission of guilt, LG. Farben's "gesture" was made on a purely 
"voluntary" note. I. G. Farben paid no compensation for non-Jewish laborers. 
Superficially, the LG. Farben cartel has vanished, but it has been replaced by 
oligopolies of the same lineage. "Each now is far larger than I.G. Farben at its zenith. 
BASF, Hoechst, and Bayer are multinational giants with total turnover in 1989 ofDM133 
billion. In the U.S. alone, the three companies now have a combined turnover of $17 
billion and employ 70,000 people."2 17 Of the ten German stocks listed in the financial 
section of The New York Times, the values of the "Big Three" appear daily. The chemical 
giant of the Hitler Era has become a "bull" of the German Wirtschaflswunder. 
216 Marsh, The New Germany, p. I 7 
217 Ibid., p. 15 
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V. SUMMARY 
The main points of this thesis are as follows: 
• There has not been adequate attention to, nor study of the history of business elites, 
particularly in western industrial nations. This may be due to the immersion of 
scholars in a society which embraces the business ethos, and perhaps also to 
potential opportunities for corporate sponsorship. The pervasive disinterest in the 
analysis of business history and the tendency of businesses to maintain secrecy make 
it difficult for scholars seeking primary historical data in this area, and to document 
the mechanisms by which business elites exert their power. 
• Business elites universally - and often aggressively - maintain their grip on the means 
of production, property and social privileges at the expense of the masses. The state 
and its military apparatus are used by elites as an instrument to build and hoard 
capital, and to compete effectively on a global scale; thus elites promote political 
systems which best serve their interests, and avoid implementing non-beneficial 
policies. 
• The German industrial sector of World War II was rapidly developed during 
successive wartime economies beginning in the 1870's; this fact contributed to its 
military-oriented production, an intense nationalistic competitiveness, and the 
progressive organization of competing companies into cartels, such as I.G. Farben. 
Their integration, intensified by Gleichschaltung, facilitated the mobilization of the 
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Nazi war machine, and intensified the drive towards territorial expansion in the 
interest of accumulating capital for the German state. 
• German business elites initially aligned with the NSDAP to avert a winning political 
coalition dominated by the Communist Party, and to continue the Weimar policy of 
keeping oil import duties high. Indeed, they planned for their own continuity after 
the inevitable post-war demise of National Socialism. However, the commitment of 
big business elites to the Third Reich was eventually achieved through accelerating 
their state-sponsored subsidies, combined with other incentives such as control of 
labor organizations, acquisition of dispossessed property, and in the end, use of a 
free, portable and disposable work force. 
• With its monopoly over the manufacture of products critical to the war effort, and its 
global business interests, LG. Farben became one of the most powerful companies in 
the world during World War II., and an integral part of the Third Reich power 
structure. The Reich's policy of reducing dependence on foreign raw materials and 
detaching the country from unfavorable foreign exchange made it further dependent 
on LG. Farben for the development of synthetic goods, diverting to the company 
enormous research subsidies and further fueling the growth of company profits. The 
company reciprocated with generous contributions to the NSDAP. 
• Despite the initial plea of LG. Farben executive Bosch to the Third Reich on behalf of 
Jewish associates and scientists, the company quickly moved to profit from the 
purging of Jewish executives and the acquisition ofliquidated Jewish assets. 
Company directors not only became Party members, but intimates in the Nazi inner 
Page 99 
circle and SS members. As the war progressed on two fronts, I.G. Farben 
aggressively pursued the exploitation of slave labor, investing heavily in the building 
of Auschwitz, and in doing so, condemned to death millions of civilians in labor 
camps and concentration camps. 
• During the post-war occupation of Germany, the Allied powers were soon 
preoccupied with Western European stability as a bulwark against Soviet 
communism; this, in part, contributed to the relatively light sentences handed to I.G. 
Farben and other German business executives, who in many cases were reinstated in 
their former positions. While Farben company patents were confiscated by the 
Allies, particularly the U.S., and the cartel deconcentrated, the three successor 
companies are now each bigger than their parent company ever was, with combined 
assets of seventeen billion dollars. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Germany always had two bosses: one the General Staff, and the other the 
Rhine industrialists. We still have the latter only a little chastened. Let us 
not take on the other for a while.218 (John McCloy to Henry Stimson 
June 28, 1950) 
If industry can cooperate across the frontiers, then governments will 
follow. 2 19 (Professor Hanson - Farbenfabrik Bayer) 
218 Kai Bird, The Chairman (New York, 1992), p. 332 
219 Anthony Sampson, Anatomy of Europe (New York, 1968), p. 101 
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When I first began researching I.G. Farben's involvement with the Third Reich, I 
had little idea of the volume of material in this area. At the same time, it is only now in 
the last decade of the twentieth century that serious public discussion of the role of 
corporations in the Third Reich has emerged after forty years of meager academic 
interest in this topic. With few exceptions, notably the popular best-seller, William 
Manchester's The Arms of Krupp, scholarly research into the role of business in the Third 
Reich has been sparse or extremely politicized from the 1950s through the 1980s. 
As is often the case, a history may not be dispassionately written until all 
participants are dead. When Fritz Fischer's controversial views in the 1960s regarding 
primacy of German guilt in causing the First World War were put forth, many scholars 
were initially outraged. Similarly, we have also arrived at the "magic" threshold at which 
events during the Third Reich may be subject to more critical examination. 
During the Cold War period, NATO and the West did not want to offend its 
wealthiest European ally. Less than a half century later, most individuals, governments, 
and corporate representatives could claim that atrocities that engulfed Europe during 
World War II took place, according to the then popular saying, ohne mich. 
Fifty years after the end of World War II, politicians and journalists have renewed 
interest in the business dealings of the Third Reich. Front page stories by journalists such 
as Alan Cowell of The New York Times have given impetus to the following stories: 
"Volkswagen's Past: Dark Side Revisited"(l l/7/96), "Swiss Acknowledge Profiting from 
Nazi Gold"(12/14/96), and "Three Nations Agree on Freezing Gold Looted By 
Nazis"(2/4/97) In view of intensive efforts to study Hitler and uncover the Nazi past, it 
is not remarkable that these stories have been gaining considerable attention at a time 
when most participants have passed away from their professional positions and from life. 
Although firms like Daimler-Benz, Siemens and the components of I.G. Farben, which 
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initiated complicity with Hitler's policies over fifty years ago still exist, contemporary 
concern about the "good names" of German companies may not be as vital to their 
success as it was a half century ago. " ... und damit wird ein Punkt beruehrt, der vom 
deutschen Geschichtspunkt der wesentliche in diesem Prozess ist. Es geht hier nicht um 
einzelne Industrielle und Kaufleute, sondern um die Sauberkeit eines in der ganzen Welt 
beruehmten deutschen Firmenamens! 11220 
Ihr Appetit ist bodenlos 
Sie fressen Gott und die Welt 
Sie saeen nicht. Sie emten bloss 
Sie schwaengem ihr eignes Geld 221 (Erich Kaestner) 
It was the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) that initiated 
the Holocaust, not the industrial or financial elite, nor the German medical community, 
nor the German military. But the party enlisted a wide range of collaborators, including 
doctors, teachers, professors, and the military, among others. JosefMengele, who has 
been called "the angel of extermination,"222 disappeared from a British internment 
hospital after the war, but there is little doubt that ifhe would have been caught, he 
would have faced the same fate as Adolf Eichmann. There seemed to be no problem for 
the world to hate a Dr. Mengele, the chief doctor at Auschwitz, as a single medical 
doctor can be replaced, and an individual who can be identified with a face and a name 
presents a visible target. However, the Third Reich's less visible Plenipotentiary for 
Labor Allocation was also held accountable for his deeds. The unknown Fritz Sauckel, 
the former Thuringian Gauleiter (District Leader) and later member of the Reichstag, 
220 HGST, "Ein Konzem steht vor Gericht," Die Zeit, February 12, 1948, p. 8 
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sent more than five million foreign slaves into the service of the Nazi war machine. He 
would receive the death sentence at Nuremberg; even though he could not accept the fact 
that he was to die merely for carrying out the orders of his superiors. 223 Defendants like 
Generals Jodl and Keitel were "following orders", but again, government officials and 
generals are easily replaced. Who apparently could not be so easily replaced are genius-
scientists and like Freiherr Wernher von Braun, businessmen like Gustav Krupp von 
Bohlen und Halbach and his son Alfred, or companies like I. G. Farben. Von Braun, a 
rocket researcher for Hitler's Reich, came to the United States in 1945. He eventually 
played an important role in all phases of the American moon flight program, and was a 
personal friend of President John F. Kennedy. 
In the "best of all possible worlds", property provides individuals with a source of 
protection; those who possess and enjoy their own property are more likely to respect the 
property of others. But property, like all possessions, reflects the personality of its 
owner, particularly in the top echelons which are most fearful of stagnating resources. In 
capitalist systems, it is considered almost unethical to stop "struggling" toward all 
features of upward economic mobility, not least continuously expanding capital; this 
kampfwas also at the core of Hitler's ideological and socio-economic programs. For the 
corporate elite in the Third Reich, the regime served as an instrument to achieve ever-
increasing growth of institutional and personal resources through war profiteering and 
exploitation of free and disposable labor. 
Major corporations are, often falsely, too closely identified with a specific state, 
particularly in our era of multi-national corporations which concern themselves with the 
welfare of the corporation above any allegiance to the state. To a decreasing extent, 
223 Ibid., p. 306 loc. cit. 
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Volkswagen is a "German" corporation, particularly as the supply and organization of 
material and labor are decentralized world-wide. Although this tendency towards 
globalism on the part of big business was evident in Germany of the late I 920s, its 
corporations were more decisively nationalistic in the 1930s and 1940s. After the Great 
Depression, which some blamed on the failure of the U.S. capitalist model, the National 
Socialists devised a plan by which "a German bloc ... was to be expanded towards the East 
and the West by force of arms and then to be permanently secured by military means. 
This power bloc was to be taken out of the international system of multilateral political 
cooperation and peace preservation. 11224 
Among the privately owned German companies, LG. Farben was the largest 
employer of concentration camp prisoners. As early as 1942, 
Farben's total number of workers reached 200,000, of which 
approximately fifty per cent were slave labor. Poison gasses and various 
deadly pharmaceuticals manufactured by Farben and supplied by Farben 
to the officials of the SS were used in experimentation upon and the 
extermination of enslaved persons in concentration camps throughout 
Europe.225 
In the context of author David Schoenbaum's assertion that in the Third Reich 
"there were no ... reliable indications of what was up and what was down,"226 there were, 
nevertheless, "opportunities available during this period which strengthened ... 
concentration of monopoly power by such large firms as LG. Farben."227 Executives at 
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228 but their professional 'competition' was an impetus to a system that encouraged the 
powerful to systematically destroy the powerless. Whether politicians induced or 
coerced this institutional behavior, the partnership between LG. Farben and NSDAP 
executives "reminds us that, when political changes condition profit making in ways that 
tend to have immoral results, a capitalist system will prove strikingly malleable. 11229 
One of the great ironies of this period is that while nationalist and militarist elites 
were not allowed to participate in the building of the post war order, industrialists and 
business executives were granted legitimate leadership roles in the new state. Executives 
in major cartels like I.G. Farben and Krupp, as well as less-significant elites, dominated 
policy-making during the early Wirtschaftswunderjahren in the Bundesrepublik.(see 
appendix) These "miracle" conditions were designed to subsidize economic order in a 
nation in danger of gravitating toward the Soviet Union. 
The increasing number of academicians with Leftist views like Tim Mason, have 
acknowledged that it is "impossible to speak about fascism without speaking of 
capitalism [and]that genocide was at least as basic to Nazi purposes as class war." 230 
The pact between members of Hitler's racist ideology and the industrial elites' program of 
substantially increasing profits and reducing the minimum price of labor came together at 
Auschwitz and other KZs. Representatives of LG. Farben and other cartels "acted as 
efficiently within the Nazi bureaucracy as they had in their own organization. "231 With 
iced hands, they plucked out surplus labor from Jews, Poles, and other "throw-away 
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industrial profits. Many of these same individuals presided over the same companies 
after World War IL Believing that they lacked an alternative means of controlling post-
war destabilization and revolutionary influences, the occupation governments lost 
interest in prosecuting elites. 
"To an increasing degree, capitalist economies are directed by the entirely 
invisible hands of the monopolists, multinational giants and domestic oligopolists"232 
Americans have generally mistrusted nationalists, militarists, big labor and big business, 
but Americans making important decisions in Germany after the war appeared to have 
been either closely associated with the latter or persuaded to put aside their misgivings 
about the same. Up front were names like McCloy, Forrestal, Averell Harriman, Philip 
Reed (head of General Electric), Allan Dulles and Ambassador to Germany, Robert 
Murphy. Upon ordering the release of an associate of Carl Krauch who had been 
interned for crimes against humanity, Ambassador Murphy made the following 
statement: "It is not in conformity with American standards to cut away the basis of 
private property. 11233 
Capable industrialists were needed to advance wiederaufbau, the war against 
communism in Germany, and in the end, it was commonplace that German business 
elites were not doomed to perish in the manner of their political leaders, their party, their 
National Socialist government, or even their country. On the shoulders of temporal 
political power, German elites transferred funds through their multinational and third 
country affiliations. 
Although usually translated as accountability, the German meaning of 
232 Robert Lekachman, Capitalism (New York, 1981 ), p. 170 
233 Charles Higham, Trading With the Enemy (New York, 1983), p. 214 
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Verantwortlichkeit is considerably stronger than its English counterpart. By definition, 
an accusation for which to be verantwortlich, denotes a degree of guilt. It implies that 
retribution must be made for any accused wrongdoing. Retribution was enforced in top 
level political, military, and even medical sectors of the Third Reich, but it has been 
argued that business leaders were "let off'' with a slap on the hand. It became 
increasingly in the vital interest of western democracies to reconstruct post-war Germany 
into a viable capitalist buffer against the communist areas to the east. In tum, many of 
the large companies which prospered in the war economy of the Third Reich quickly re-
established their position in the western Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and. The enthusiastic 
commitment of German business elites to profit-making was considered vital in the war 
against communism and to rebuild the shattered western half of Germany. Once again, 
politics played handmaiden to profit. 
Switzerland, neutral during the war, also has been accused of acting as Adolf 
Hitler's banker and laundering billions of dollars in gold looted from Jews and the central 
banks of occupied countries. "234 Switzerland bought German gold, and according to the 
1943 World Almanac, Adolf Hitler's annual income was reported at $12,000,000 a 
year.235 More than just Jewish "gold" was sent to Switzerland and elsewhere. Since 
many business elites, had shuffled their priorities to fit into Germany's inevitable defeat 
midway through the war, financial safehavens were not overlooked. No executive from 
I.G. Farben was determined to follow their chancellor in death. 
234 Alan Cowell, "Swiss Will Share Control of Holocaust Fund With Jews", The 
Oregonian, February 27, 1997, p. A5 
235 June Foley, Mark Hoffman, and Thomas McGuire, editors, The World Almanac 
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Even during times of such upheaval, these individuals and corporations eventually 
resumed their traditional roles with what appears to be detached justification. Shortly 
after his early release from prison, industrialist Krupp, who had been convicted for 
crimes against humanity and plunder, was approached by a reporter and to whom he had 
described the above as "lesser crimes". Krupp "shrugged his shoulders and declined: Wir 
muessen noch einmal den ganzen verhandlungsbericht durchkauen. Ersparen Sie mir 
das, bitte. "236 He went on to defend his role in the Third Reich by explaining that "what 
a plant makes depends, after all, not only on the decisions of its owner, but also on 
official policies. "Mein Leben ist immer vom Lauf der Geschichte, nicht von mir selbst 
bestimmt worden."237 There is a sense of his self-proclaimed mystical mission of 
leadership in these words. 
While a less centralized post-World War II Federal German state reflected a break 
with the Nazi past, the partition of German lands divided the industry of the German west 
from its prewar domestic market in the east. Skilled East German refugees and 
undervaluation of the German mark kept wages down. Long time members of the 
NSDAP and even the SS filled positions of honor and influence enthusiastically in the 
Bundesrepublik. Nevertheless, by 1949 in the eastern zone, "the task of 
Vergangenheitsbewae/tigung-- overcoming the past-- had already been completed, 
according to article 6, paragraph 1 of the East German constitution, which declares: The 
German Democratic Republic has ... rooted out and destroyed German militarism and 
Nazism. 11238 
236 Manchester, The Arms of Krupp, p. 773 
237 Ibid., p. 774 
238 Peter Schneider, The German Comedy trans. from the German by Philip Boehm and 
Leigh Hafrey (New York, 1991), p. 155 
Page 108 
German corporate elites did not fare well in the Soviet Zone after the war, since a 
great many East Germans were dedicated toward building a socialist state. In the 
chemical industry, "the division of Germany into four zones caused production gaps and 
raw materials bottlenecks ... Plants in central Germany and Upper Silesia were lost, and 
thus the integrated economy of the industry was largely ruined."239 Drueben was 
generally not conducive to the remnants ofI.G. Farben's corporate leadership as it was in 
the West. 
Tens of thousands left the GDR, but few, if any, business elites willingly stayed. 
For forty years, the GDR maintained a break with the German past and a "false tradition 
of a clear conscience ... (until) ... Hans Modrow's transitional government wrote to the 
World J~wish Congress acknowledging 'the responsibility of the entire German nation' 
for crimes against the Jews." 240 Between 1989 and 1991, almost overnight, Herr 
Durchschnitt-ost had lost their country and their identity, but gained a new past to 
replace the old in order to participate pragmatically in a unified German state. Perhaps 
Herr Modrow believed that if the citizens of the GDR took responsibility for the Nazi 
past, it would be less detrimental for their professional and political reputations than their 
more recent dedication to a communist Stasi state. 
Taken as a whole, motives which determined the actions of men who headed 
major German corporations such as LG. Farben have received more attention behind the 
former "iron curtain" than in the West. It can be argued that effective businesspeople 
239 Wilhelm Gratkopp, Heinrich Spieker, Dorothea Kempff, editors, Germany 19-15-
1954 (Schaan, Liechtenstein, No Date), p. 188 
240 Schneider, p. 157 
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have always made every effort to learn how customers prefer to deal and to "collaborate 
with the government to the best of its ability1124 l 
As the Bundesrepuhlik was so easily swayed after the war from Nazism to 
democracy, fifty years later the authoritarian GDR followed suit. In 1990, "East German 
Finance Minister Theo Waigel called unification a 'zero hour' ... (but) ... some people 
realized they would never work again. 11242 Unlike the original Stunde Null, after which 
millions of Nazi party members remained in conspicuous positions of power, members of 
the SEO were expelled "from university facilities, government offices and other public 
positions ... 243 after zero hour number two. 
West German firms expanded into the east, and the SEO, VEB, and the FDGB 
became history. Again, there were trials. Once more, German politicians, the military, 
and, the police, served as proxies for business elites. Leading West German financiers, 
industrialists, and Junkers have privatized industry and replaced former land owners in 
the former GDR lands. The authorities which had the means of production in the best of 
the eastern economies were required to accept western capital investment according to 
Treuhand's terms. Unlike Daimler-Benz, Volkswagen, Siemens, and the Farben Group 
which have flourished since the war, most East German firms, including the nation's 
airline, Interflug, have gone under. The communist elite, the nomenklatura, has 
"disappeared", but many of these former top officials have made new connections with 
western entrepreneurs. It is still too early to compare the dynamics of 
"decommunization" and the de-Nazification in the late 1940s. 
24 i Dorpalen, p. 400 
242 Marc Fisher, After the Wall (New York, Simon and Schuster), p. 187 
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Fifty years after the end of World War II, Bayer, Hoechst, BASF and their 
subsidiaries continue to wield the inherited resources of I.G. Farben. Unlike the era of its 
death camps and forced labor, today, the former Farben Group members are run just as 
ethically as any business in a country with solid democratic institutions. Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl, former BASF employee and prior Hitler Youth member, has presided over 
Germany's liberal democracy for fifteen years. He speaks repeatedly about his "blessing 
of a late birth. My generation was too young to become involved in guilt. 11244 
Dr. Kohl, who was interested in political leadership "als Siebzehnjaehriger 194 7 
Mitgruender der Jungen Union"245 has incessantly articulated his generation's revolt 
against the generation of National Socialist "elders." His biographer Oskar Fehrenbach 
recounted the young man's Bi/dung: 
For ten years Kohl worked for the trade association of the chemical 
industry, carrying out his political engagement in his free time. These 
were the years when Germany was still governed by the 'grandfathers,' 
who had gained their political experience during the Weimar Republic 
and had then opposed National Socialism. Kohl represented, as almost no 
one else did, the postwar generation, ... which felt called upon to succeed 
the pre-war old guard. The generation in between was virtually absent 
from political life. 246 
It is unclear whether journalist Fehrenbach, who was born in 1923 and eventually 
became editor in chief of the Stuttgarter Zeitung, participated in the Third Reich but a 
generation of Kohl's NSDAP 'elders' did preside over west German politics. 
Bundespraesident Heinrich Luebke, Bundeskan=ler Kurt Georg Kiesinger, and CSU 
244 Hans Klein, editor, The German Chancellors (Chicago, 1996), p. 329 
245 Wolf-Ruediger Baumann and Gustav Fochler-Hauke, Biographien :::ur Zeitgeschichte 
19-15-1983 (Frankfurt am Main, 1986), p. 282 
246 Klein, p. 330 
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leader Franz Josef Strauss bridged the Weimar generation with Kohl's united Germany. 
As a private contractor, Luebke built concentration camps at for the SS at Peenemuende 
and elsewhere, Kiesinger was a member "von 1940 bis 1945 der Rundfunkpolitischen 
Abteilung des Auswaertigen Amts als Referatsleiter Allgemeine Propaganda, Verbindung 
zum Reichspropagandaministerium, ... "247 and in 1943, Strauss "stand bedingungsloser 
Nationalsozialist zu sein nun an erster Stelle. "248 Even former SPD Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt had been a member of the Hitler Youth from 1933-1936. 
Today, a united Germany continues to flourish as a highly cultural nation with a 
model education system. It also presides as the most important economic power in 
Europe. But unlike 1933, the world is not holding its breath to see what Germany can do 
with its institutions. History has taught us that the pendulum not only sways easily from 
democracy to a system like Nazism, but also back to liberal democracy if certain 
economic conditions prevail. Even in Eastern Europe, we have witnessed a relatively 
swift non-violent transition. There are always politicians and military leaders who avail 
themselves of the opportunity to take credit for these perceived breaks in historical 
continuity, but how often do they supplant the wealthowners in power? 
My research has led me to speculate that business elites continuously adapt 
themselves to diverse state regimes, and are thus able to withstand even violent political 
transitions as long as the source of their essential materials and their markets are not 
disrupted. However, their participation in political life appears intended only to 
manipulate the instruments of state to maximize their profits. 
247 Brent Engelmann, Schwar= Buch (Goettingen, 1986), p. 60 
248 Ibid., p. 73 
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To the extent that the leveraging of industrial and financial resources is essential 
for the survival of political regimes, big business is likely to continue to be the invisible 
architect of State policy. With their ownership of the large-scale resources needed to 
extract and process raw materials; their monopolization of technical expertise; their 
stewardship of key educational and social organizations; their skill in creating 
dependence on consumer products; and their personal insulation from the legal 
consequences of corporate wrongdoing, one might argue that the continuing dominance 
of elites in capitalist societies is assured. 
Durch diese Handlungsweise uebemahm die IG eine grosse 
Verantwortung und stellte eine wesentliche und auf chemischen Gebiet 
entscheidende Hilfe fuer Hitlers Aussenpolitik, die zum Krieg und zu 
Deutschlands Ruin fuehrte. So muss ich den Schluss ziehen, dass die IG 
weithin fuer Hitlers Politik verantwortlich ist 249 (Georg von Schnitzler 
I.G. Farben Vorstand) 
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APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS 
Aktiengese/lschqft (AG) : a stock corporation. Most are publicly traded, but they need not 
be. 
Aufsichtsrat {AR) : a company's supervisory board, much like a board of directors. 
Autarky : Economic policy aimed at the highest degree of self-sufficiency, i.e., 
independence from imports.+ 
Cartel : combination of firms which, although retaining their separate legal identities, 
combine to pursue a common policy in their joint economic interests. 
Drueben: "over there" - East Germany 
End/oesung der Judenfrage: final solution of the Jewish Question 
FDGB : free organizational union of German workers 
Gemeinschaft : 'community' was the traditional form of association that was superseded 
by the modem society (Gesellschaft). Vo/ksgemeinschaft meant anti-modernism. 
Gese//schqft mit beschraenkter Hqfiung (GmbH) : privately held, limited liability 
corporation 
Lebensraum : living-space 
SED_: socialist unity party 
Sonderbehandlunf!. : special action 
VEB : state production-consumer cooperative in GDR 
Vorstand: management board, which includes a company's chief executive along with 
other top executives. No one from the management board may serve on the same 
company's supervisory board. 
Wjederaufbau : reconstruction 
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APPENDIX 2: LETTER FROM SCHMITZ TO HITLER; 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO IDTLER FROM IG FARBEN'S 
CENTRAL OFFICE, 1933-19442so 
30. September 1938 
An den Fuehrer und Reichskanzler 
Adolf Hitler 
Berlin 
Unter dem Eindruck der von Ihnen, mein Fuehrer, erreichten Heimkehr 
Sudetendeutschlands ins Reich stellt Ihnen di IG-Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft zur 
Verwndung fuer das sudedeutsche Gebiet einen Betrag von einer halben Million 
Reichsmark zur Verfuegung. 
Hermann Schmitz 
(JG Farben Prozess, Dokument NO NI-2795) 
Ingesamt waren es nachweisbar 84 200 353, -- RM, die unmittelbar die Konzernzentrale 
Hitlers Terrorapparat zufliessen Iiess, eine Summe, die sich wie folgt verteilte: 
1933 3 584 070, --RM 
1934 4 020 205, --RM 
1935 4 515 039, --RM 
1936 4 960 636, --RM 
1937 5 467 626, --RM 
1938 8156315,--RM 
1939 7 539 857, --RM 
1940 7 471 620, --RM 
1941 8 057 982, --RM 
1942 13 436 201, --RM 
1943 8 588 650, --RM 
1944 8 402 152, --RM 
(Dokument Maurer-Prozess, Teil I, Band II, Bl. 69/71) 
These were the contributions from the 'Dachgesellschaft'. They do not include 
contributions of'sister' companies. 
250 Schmelzer, p. 77 
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APPENDIX 3: SENTENCES OF I.G. FARBEN BOARD MEMBERS, 
NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALs25 l 
Otto Ambros: Guilty of slavery and mass murder, sentenced to imprisonment for eight 
years. Served eight years. 
Heinrich Buetefisch: Guilty of slavery and mass murder, sentenced to imprisonment for 
six years. Served six years. 
Walter Duerrfeld: Guilty of slavery and mass murder, sentenced to imprisonment for 
eight years. Served eight years. 
Paul Haejliger: Guilty of plunder and spoliation, sentenced to imprisonment for two 
years. 
Friedrich Jaehne: Guilty of plunder and spoliation, sentenced to imprisonment for one 
and one-half-years. 
Carl Krauch: Guilty of slavery and mass murder, sentenced to imprisonment for eight 
years. Served eight years. 
Hans Kugler: Guilty of plunder and spoliation, sentenced to one and one-half years. 
Heinrich Oster: Guilty of plunder and spoliation, sentenced to imprisonment for two 
years. 
Hermann Schmit=: Guilty of plunder and spoliation, sentenced to imprisonment for four 
years. 
Georg van Schnitzler: Guilty of plunder and spoliation, sentenced to imprisonment for 
five years. 
Frit= ter Meer: Guilty of plunder and spoliation, and count three, slavery and mass 
murder, sentenced to imprisonment for eight years. Pardoned---seven years. 
25 I Borkin, p. 154 
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APPENDIX 4: POSITIONS OF FARBEN BOARD MEMBERS 
BEFORE AND AFTER 1945 
Ambros, Otto: Before 1945: Production chief, buna rubber and poison gases; 
Executive Manager of IG Farben-Industrie,AG, Auschwitz 
After 1945: Positions in several major German companies, such 
as Telefunken, AG; Advisor as of 1951 to the Bonn government 
Biedenkopf, William: Before 1945: Director ofI.G. Farben Industrie, AG, Frankfurt-am-
Main. After 1945: Mamber of managing board of three German 
companies, including Dynamit Noble, AG (Flick concern) 
Buetefisch, Heinrich: Before 1945: Member of managing board, IG Farben, Frankfurt-
am-Main; Lieutenant-Colonel in the SS. After 1945: Member of 
the supervisory board of two German chemical companies 
Duerrfeld,Walther: Before 1945: Director and construction manager ofFarben-
Industrie AG, Werk Auschwitz. After 1945: Board member of 
two German chemical companies 
Eisfeld, Kurt: Before 1945: Leading chemist in Farben Industrie, AG, Werk 
Auschwitz. After 1945: Board member, two Flick companies. 
Jaehne, Friedrich: Before 1945: Chief engineer, construction and physical plant 
development. After 1945: Honorable member of the supervisory 
board, Hoechst Farbenwerk, AG. 
Kugler, Hans: Before 1945: Organizing manager ofFarben's "newly acquired" 
European plants. After 1945: Executive of two German 
companies. 
Ter Meer, Fritz: 
Winnacker, Karl: 
Wurster, Carl: 
Before 1945: Chief, Technical Committee which directed all 
I.G. Farben production. After 1945: Honorary executive for 
Bayer, AG, a Farben company. 
Before 1945: Director of Farbewerke Hoechst, AG, Frankfurt. 
After 1945: Same position. 
Before 1945, Technical Director, inorganic factories; Assistant 
to Ambros in development of chemical warfare agents. 
After 1945: Managing Board Chair, BASF (a Farben company) 
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APPENDIX 5: ORDER FOR THE DECONCENTRA TION 
OF I.G. FARBEN 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT - GERMANY 
UNITED STATES ZONE 
GENERAL ORDER No. 2 
(PURSUANT TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT LAW NO. 52 - BLOCKING 
AND CONTROL OF PROPERTY) 
I. G. FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G.252 
WHEREAS, it is the main objective of the United Nations to prevent Germany from 
ever again disrupting the peace of the world; 
WHEREAS, LG. FARBENINDUSTRIE AG. played a prominent part in building up 
and maintaining the German war machine; 
WHEREAS, through its world-wide cartel system and practices, LG. 
FARBENINDUSTRIE AG., as a deliberate part of Germany's bid for world conquest, 
hampered the growth of industry and commerce of other nations and weakened their 
power to defend themselves; 
WHEREAS, the war-making power represented by the industries owned or controlled 
by LG. FARBENINDUSTRIE AG. constitutes a major threat to the peace and security of 
the post-war world so long as such industries remain within the control of Germany; 
WHEREAS, it is essential to the objectives of the United Nations to take over the 
direction and control of LG. FARBENINDUSTRIE AG. and to seize possession of its 
property in order to bring about its destruction and the war-making potential which it 
represents; and 
WHEREAS, it is intended that the property seized will be placed at the disposition of 
the Control Council (Germany), when such action is desired by the Control Council; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
l. All the property within the United States Zone in Germany owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by LG. FARBENINDUSTRIE AG., a corporation organized and 
existing under and by virtue of the laws of Germany with seat and head office at 
Frankfurt am/Main, is hereby specified under paragraph I (g) of Military Government 
Law No. 52 to be subject to seizure of possession, direction, and control of the by 
Military Government. 
252 Sasuly, pp. 264-265 
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2. The direction and control of LG. FARBENlNDUSTRIE A.G. and the possession of 
all its property in the United States Zone are hereby seized by the Military Governor, 
United States Zone. 
3. Pending the assumption of control of such property by the Control Council, or an 
agency thereof, all the powers of the Military Governor, United States Zone, with respect 
to the property seized pursuant hereto and with respect to the direction and control of the 
corporation are hereby delegated to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone. 
Redelegation of any or all such powers is hereby authorized. In the exercise of such 
powers, the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone, or any person acting by or 
under his authority with respect to the property affected hereby shall not be subject to 
German law. 
4. In the exercise of such powers the Deputy Military Governor, or any person acting 
by or under his authority with respect to such property, shall be guided by the general 
objectives stated in the preamble hereof and by the following specific objectives, and will 
take such measures as he deems appropriate to accomplish them: 
a. The making available to devastated non-enemy countries of Europe and the United 
Nations, in accordance with such programs of relief, restitution, and reparations as may 
be decided upon, of any of the property seized under this order and, in particular, of 
laboratories, plants, and equipment which produce chemicals, synthetic petroleum and 
rubber, magnesium and aluminum, other non-ferrous metals, iron and steel, machine 
tools and heavy machinery. 
b. Destruction of all property seized under this order and not transferred under the 
provisions of paragraph a above if adapted to the production of arms, ammunition, poison 
gas, explosives, and other implements of war, or any parts, components, or ingredients 
designed for incorporation in the foregoing, and not of a type generally used in industries 
permitted to operate within Germany; 
c. Dispersion of the ownership and control of such plants and equipment seized under 
this order as have not been transferred or destroyed pursuant to paragraphs a and b above. 
5. a.The entire management ofI.G. FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G., including but not 
limited to the supervising board (Aufsichtsrat), the board of directors (Vorstand), and 
directors (Direktorium) and all other persons, whether office-holders or not, who are 
empowered, either alone or with others, to bind or sign for on behalf of LG. 
FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G. are forthwith removed and discharged and deprived of all 
authority to act with respect to the corporation or its property. 
b. The rights of shareholders in respect of selection of management or control ofI.G. 
FARBENINDUSTRIE A.G. are suspended. 
6. Article IV of Military Government Law No. 5 shall not be applicable to any 
property or enterprise affected by this General Order. 
7. This General Order shall become effective on 5 July, 1945. 
BY ORDER OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
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APPENDIX 6: TRANSLATIONS OF GERMAN TEXT 
BY FOOTNOTE 253 
FOOTNOTE 
# 2 You dare to print such books! 
Truest friend, you are lost! 
If you want money and honor 
Then you must pay the cost! 
# 6 Where would the Holy Ghost be if He had to be present at everyone's 
personal beck and call? 
# 8 The (written) history of all former societies is the history of class struggle. 
#25 For whom, you good German folk 
Ladens you with weapons? 
For whom do you leave your wife, and child 
and have your cattle taken? 
#39 One should never lose one's dignity -- Regarding morality, I understand it 
as the real product of two imaginary powers. The imaginary powers are 
should and would. The product is called morality, and no one is permitted 
to deny its reality. 
#52 ... that the LG. should follow a course which did not ring in unison with the 
government was unthinkable - and that the LG. would have deviated from 
a government order, or that the company might have taken an open or 
secret opposing position - was out of the question. It was the same when 
Germany was a democratic state in which the government's standards 
could be easily criticized. The I. G. was equally true to the governments 
under Stressemann as under the rule of Bruening and Papen. 
#72 Carl Duisberg had a nervous disposition. He was political, a well 
organized and exact thinker. At the same time, he was an especially 
engaging entrepreneur. Carl Bosch was a scientist, a technical-type and a 
genius with all the merits and weaknesses of such a person. The two men 
253 Translations by Robert Arthur Reinert 
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contrasted and clashed sharply. Yet they had a love-hate relationship, and 
were careful not to offend each other. 
#73 founder and leader of the large chemical industry in Germany. 
#77 On the long train ride to Munich, Buetefisch and I discussed the LG., 
especially regarding the new processes. We had prepared our talk with 
Hitler as much as possible. We didn't expect too much since up to this 
point we viewed the National Socialists as chaotic and against us. 
#82 That the meeting with Hitler in June happened, according to 
documentation, was also not challenged by Buetefisch. But Gattineau was 
somewhat confused regarding the dates of the meeting. And if, as he 
maintained, the attack of National Socialist publications against the LG. 
was supposed to be the single cause for the meeting, then why did one 
wait until Fall with the complaint? The last known National Socialist 
article against the LG. originated in March, 1932. 
#83 The consumers are the left hand of the societal organism, the producers 
are the right hand. 
#126 personified the unity of the party, state and the "community of interests." 
# 136 Since 1934, I served in the administration of concentration camps. I 
served in Dachau until 1938; then as adjutant in Sachsenhausen from 1938 
until May I, 1940, at which time I was named commandant at Auschwitz. 
I commanded Auschwitz until December 1, 1943 and I reckon 2,500,000 
people were executed and exterminated. At least another 500,000 died 
from hunger and sickness. The entire number of deaths totaled about 
3,000,000. This is about 70-80% of all persons there, who, on top of it, 
were used as slaveworkers in the industries which the concentration 
camps served. 
# 140 celebrated the company's 50th anniversary with the SA 
#141 Without the LG. Farben, particularly in the fields of fuel and magnesium, 
it would have been out of the question for Germany to initiate a war. 
#158 I spoke often with D. Ambros while I was present in Ludwigshafen in 
1941. To my knowledge, Dr. Ambros was entrusted with responsibility for 
the entire Buna Production for LG. Farben. During my time there, he 
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visited the camp at Auschwitz two or three times. I saw him at various 
times at the Buna operations in Auschwitz. 
I'm certain that Dr. Ambros knew as much as all the other visitors to 
Auschwitz about the annihilation of human lives at Birkenau. This 
information was known in the city of Auschwitz, at the Buna plant and in 
the vicinity of the camp. Stories of exterminations were commonly 
discussed. 
#160 The normal work week averages between 56-58 hours, while some 
companies work 70 hours. 
# 161 In some branches of industry, the workload is almost impossible to bear. 
In the iron and steel plants work hours have been expanded to 12 hours. 
At the same time, many workers have a five to fifteen kilometer journey to 
and from work. Most of them must also take care of some farming 
chores. It is understandable that such demands cause ill feelings. At 
times, compulsory service in the German work-force must also be 
administered by police coercion. 
# 175 The Nuremberg war crimes trials are a tragic derision of American justice. 
# 180 Under your direction, my leader, the Sudetenland has been returned 
"home" to the Reich. For use of this area, LG. Farben places half-million 
Reichsmarks at your disposal. 
# 189 The times of ignorance came, at which one gazed in amazement again. 
# 193 Germans against Germans is not a road to peace. 
#204 In the LG. Trial, ten defendants were freed while the remaining thirteen 
former directors received sentences from one and a half to eight years. 
#220 ... and here the matter rests, regarding the German point of view which is 
essential to this trial. This is not about individual businessmen, but about 
maintaining the good names of famous German companies. 
#221 Their appetite is boundless 
They eat God and the world 
They sow nothing. They harvest nothing 
They impregnate their own capital. 
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#236 "We must 'chew' through the proceedings again." "Please spare me!" 
#237 "My life is always on history's course, not controlled by me." 
#245 as a 17 year old in 1947, he co-founded the Young Union (CDU youth 
organization .. 
#24 7 from 1940-1945, department head of the foreign ministry's political 
division of radio broadcasting--in association with the propaganda 
ministry. 
#248 unquestioning National Socialist to the first degree. 
#249 With this course of action, the LG. assumed great accountability and set 
up the essential and decisive help for Hitler's foreign policy, which led to 
war and Germany's ruin. So then I must conclude that the LG. is largely 
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